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Standards in Command Responsibility
Prosecutions: How Strict, and Why?
MICHAEL J. SHERMAN1
The attached article looks at the concept of command responsibility – the
idea that a commander may be held liable for crimes committed by his or her
soldiers, even if the commander did not order these crimes to be committed,
and may not have been aware of the criminal activity at all. It examines command responsibility prosecutions attached to a number of different conflicts:
World War II, the Yugoslavian and Rwandan genocides, and the Sierra Leonean civil war. It also discusses proposed standards for command responsibility prosecutions set out by the African Union and the UN (both in the
International Criminal Court and in UN peacekeeping operations).
As the article demonstrates, the standards used for prosecuting command
responsibility cases in these various settings have differed significantly, making for important differences in the ability to hold the accused accountable.
I propose one factor that helps predict how easy or difficult it will be to prosecute command responsibility cases: the extent to which those who write the
standards have reason to fear that they themselves could be held liable under
the standards they are establishing. If they have little to fear, then the rule
setters will make it relatively easy to prosecute these cases. If they are worried, then it will be correspondingly harder to bring command responsibility
prosecutions. I then discuss the implications of this conclusion for the legitimacy of international law in this area.
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Command responsibility is the term given to a legal concept which
states that a commander bears some degree of accountability for the actions
of his or her underlings. This is hardly a novel proposition when it comes to,
for example, evaluating the performance of a senior officer’s platoon in battle. It is a relatively newer idea in the context of assigning blame and initiating prosecutions against a senior officer for human rights violations committed by his or her soldiers. However, it is by now generally accepted that a
commander can and may be held to account for such crimes, even if s/he did
not participate in them, order them, or have actual knowledge that they were
taking place. Command responsibility prosecutions have taken place in a
number of fora, including the international tribunals established to address
atrocities committed in World War II, and more recently in the former Yugoslavia (ICTY),2 Rwanda (ICTR),3 and Sierra Leone (SCSL),4 as well as the
broader jurisdiction International Criminal Court (ICC).5 In addition, the Malabo Protocol to the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights
has a command responsibility provision,6 though the Protocol has not received enough ratifications to come into effect as of yet.
While there is general acceptance of the idea of command responsibility
itself, there is no single accepted definition of what it encompasses, or what
standards should be applied in cases against commanders. Some differences
in meaning may be minor, while others may be more significant. This paper
examines some of these variations and what motivates them. In particular, I
will suggest that the less those setting the rules for command responsibility
feel that they are themselves at risk of being subject to prosecution, the more
expansively they will define the term so as to apply to others.7 This has some
troubling implications for the legitimacy of the prosecutions that follow, not
only in an abstract sense, but in terms of the perception of these international
2. See Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of
the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 art. 7(3), May 25, 1993, S.C. Res. 827 [hereinafter ICTY
Statute].
3. See Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda art. 6(3), Nov. 8,
1994, S.C. Res. 955 [hereinafter ICTR Statute].
4. See Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone art. 6(3), Jan. 16, 2002, 2178
U.N.T.S. 145 [hereinafter SCSL Statute].
5. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 28, July 17, 1998, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.183/9, reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 999 (1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute].
6. See Draft Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African
Court of Justice and Human Rights, May 15, 2014, STC/Legal/Min/7(I) Rev. 1, Art. 46(B)
[hereinafter Malabo Protocol].
7. This phenomenon may apply to the definitions used for other crimes as well,
though this article is primarily concerned with how this plays out with respect to command
responsibility.
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tribunals by the local populations, as well as the ability of countries that have
suffered these mass atrocities to move forward and develop their own legal
systems.
This paper will look at the doctrine of command responsibility in the
following way: I will begin with a brief background discussing its development. I will then examine how the charge of command responsibility has
been used in several different tribunals: the tribunal established by the United
States to try Japanese General Tomoyuki Yamashita at the close of World
War II; two cases against a large number of senior Nazi officers from what
came to be known as the Subsequent Nuremberg Proceedings (which were
also American run); tribunals launched by the UN Security Council in response to massive war crimes in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda; the
more comprehensive mandate ICC; and the “hybrid” tribunal established in
response to the civil war in Sierra Leone. In addition, I will also discuss the
proposed command responsibility provision in the Malabo Protocol.
BACKGROUND
In a 1973 article, military lawyer Major William Parks traces some of
the history of the concept of command responsibility.8 As he notes, the idea
of command responsibility (though more so in the broader sense of a superior
being responsible for the performance of his troops) can be found as far back
as Sun Tzu.9 Command responsibility as it is discussed here—the responsibility of a superior for crimes committed by his or her underlings—exists in
the works of Hugo Grotius,10 who laid the early groundwork for much of
modern international law. Grotius, writing in the early seventeenth century,
commented that “we must accept the principle that he who knows of a crime,
and is able and bound to prevent it but fails to do so, himself commits a
crime.”11 Parks also makes mention of what we would think of as something
close to a modern command responsibility prosecution from as long ago as
the 15th century, a case of an Austrian knight being convicted for failing to
prevent the commission of crimes.12
Moving to more recent times, Parks details the inclusion of command
responsibility concepts in American military documents from early in our
history. He even points out the court martial, during the Black Hawk War, of

8.
1 (1973).
9.
10.
11.
(1925).
12.

See William H. Parks, Command Responsibility for War Crimes, 62 MIL. L. REV.
See id. at 3-4.
See id. at 4.
HUGO GROTIUS, ON THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE 523 (Francis W. Kelsey trans.)
See Parks, supra note 8, at 4-5.
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one Captain Abraham Lincoln after his soldiers broke into the officers’ whiskey supplies.13 On the international front, the annex to the Fourth Hague Convention (passed in 1907) included language mandating that, to be considered
a legitimate fighting force, a military unit had to be “commanded by a person
responsible for his subordinates,”14 thereby seeming to imply the idea of
command responsibility without stating it explicitly.15
Thus, it would be inaccurate to describe command responsibility as a
purely post-WWII construct. But it is fair to say that the importance of the
concept and its use in a variety of settings has increased since 1945. The
United States held one of the first important post-WWII command responsibility trials when it prosecuted, and ultimately executed, General Yamashita
for crimes committed by forces under his command in the Philippines.
General Yamashita was charged with “unlawfully disregard[ing] and
fail[ing] to discharge his duty as commander to control the operations of the
members of his command, permitting them to commit brutal atrocities and
other high crimes”16 in the Philippines during a period which extended for
several months. There is no doubt that Japanese troops, ostensibly under
Yamashita’s control, carried out horrendous offenses, including killing an
estimated 33,000 civilians and committing hundreds of rapes.17
When the general’s appeal of his conviction reached the United States
Supreme Court, the Court cited the aforementioned Fourth Hague Convention as “plainly impos[ing] on petitioner . . . an affirmative duty to take such
measures as were within his power and appropriate in the circumstances to
protect prisoners of war and the civilian population.”18 Chief Justice Stone’s
opinion explained that the law of war’s “purpose to protect civilian populations and prisoners of war from brutality would largely be defeated if the

13. See id. at 6. The future president was sentenced to two days carrying a wooden
sword. See id. (internal citation omitted).
14. Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land [hereinafter
Fourth Hague Convention] art. 1, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 1910 WL 19348. See also
Parks, supra note 8, at 11.
15. Though one commentator suggests that this language in the Convention was not
meant to establish a duty of command responsibility on superior officers, but was directed to
distinguishing regular armies, which had formal command configurations, from loose bands
of irregular fighters (some of which existed during the American Civil War), which lacked
such structures and were intended to be excluded from the category of legitimate fighting
forces. See ALLAN A. RYAN, YAMASHITA’S GHOST: WAR CRIMES, MACARTHUR’S JUSTICE, AND
COMMAND ACCOUNTABILITY 65 (2012).
16. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 7 (1946).
17. See WILLIAM C. PETERS, Adjudication Deferred: Command Responsibility for
War Crimes and US Military Justice from My Lai to Haditha and Beyond, in CRIMES OF STATE
PAST AND PRESENT: GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED ATROCITIES AND INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
RESPONSES 174 (David M. Crowe, ed., 2011) (internal citations omitted).
18. Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 16.

302

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38-2

commander of an invading army could with impunity neglect to take reasonable measures for their protection. Hence the law of war presupposes that its
violation is to be avoided through the control of the operations of war by
commanders who are to some extent responsible for their subordinates.”19
But while the Chief Justice tried to pass off the Court’s ruling as a simple
application of existing principles, there was something new about the prosecution of Yamashita: “Prior to 1945 . . . there were . . . apparently no recorded
cases of prosecution for simply allowing a crime to take place or for not reporting one afterward.”20
Furthermore, as Allan Ryan points out, if the term “permitting” in the
charging document was read to mean “allowed to happen,” as opposed to
“actively gave approval for,” then Yamashita was arguably guilty simply by
virtue of the fact that the atrocities took place at all. Under this theory, a form
of strict liability, the commission of war crimes constituted per se proof that
Yamashita had failed to control his troops, regardless of any consideration of
steps he had, or could have, taken to prevent the wrongdoing.21
In a biting dissent, Justice Frank Murphy lambasted the procedural defects in Yamashita’s trial (including, but not limited to, the fact that the general was hit with 59 additional charges on the day his trial began, with no
continuance given in order to give his counsel the opportunity to prepare a
defense to those charges).22 He also ridiculed the assertion that Yamashita
had, in fact, anything resembling control over the combatants who committed
the atrocities, arguing that the prosecution’s case could best be summed up
as follows: “We have defeated and crushed your forces. And now we charge
and condemn you for having been inefficient in maintaining control of your
troops during the period when we were so effectively besieging and eliminating your forces and blocking your ability to maintain effective control. . .
. Our standards of judgment are whatever we wish to make them.”23 Thus,
while Murphy did not challenge the basic notion of command responsibility,
he did suggest that its standards could not be applied against a commander
whose army was in the end stages of a losing battle (not because Murphy
thought that the soon to be defeated side should be able to get away with
anything, but rather that, given the facts on the ground over the relevant period, there was no realistic way in which Yamashita could have prevented the
atrocities committed by the soldiers nominally under his control).
19. Id. at 15.
20. RYAN, supra note 15, at 64. This fact is consistent with Ryan’s assertion that the
language in the Fourth Hague Convention had not been intended or previously read as establishing command responsibility as the US military tribunal had applied it against General
Yamashita.
21. See id. at 62.
22. See Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 33 (1946) (Murphy, J. dissenting).
23. Id. at 34-35.
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Was Justice Murphy correct? Yamashita asserted a number of claims in
his defense: first, he had arrived in the Philippines as commander only a few
weeks before the beginning of the American invasion, hardly enough time to
assess the situation and to organize and assert control over his troops.24 Furthermore, while Yamashita was officially the head of all Japanese forces in
the Philippines, given the extreme level of animosity and infighting between
the Japanese army and navy, it was not clear to what degree the general truly
exercised control, especially over the latter.25 Japanese communications technology was substandard (even for the times), meaning that it would be difficult for the general to receive word of atrocities, much less to respond with
orders to desist.26 The inability to be in touch was exacerbated by Yamashita’s decision to divide his forces into three groups and to head out of urban
areas and into the mountains, terrain that he hoped would make it easier for
a smaller army to defend against an invading force,27 but a battle plan that
made contact with his troops that much more difficult.
As Ryan notes, though the charging document listed the offenses committed by Japanese forces in horrifying detail, “[t]here was no assertion that
Yamashita had committed any of the crimes, had ordered any of the crimes,
or had acquiesced in any of the crimes; indeed, there was no allegation that
he knew about any of the crimes.”28 At his trial, the general denied having
given any orders to murder civilians29 and denied receiving information of
such crimes taking place.30 Moreover, he had given orders to the navy to
abandon Manila,31 so he had no reason to think his forces were there in the
first place, much less there and committing atrocities.
Perhaps Yamashita was lying.32 Or maybe even taking his account as
accurate he should still have been held accountable, that he had to have done
something, and that at a minimum it was irresponsible of him to make it even
harder for his troops to communicate and then throw up his hands and say
“sorry, I didn’t know.” But even so, given the available precedents, Murphy
could reasonably claim that convicting Yamashita on the record presented to

24. See RYAN, supra note 15, at 32-33. Yamashita had spent the previous two years
in relative exile, commanding Japanese forces in Manchuria, a far less important posting. See
id. at 30.
25. Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 33.
26. See id. at 42-43.
27. See id.
28. ALLAN A. RYAN, YAMASHITA’S GHOST: WAR CRIMES, MACARTHUR’S JUSTICE,
AND COMMAND ACCOUNTABILITY 65 (2012).
29. See id. at 162.
30. See id. at 211.
31. See id. at 164.
32. See Parks, supra note 8, at 25-30 (discussing evidence against Yamashita).

304

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38-2

the tribunal went far beyond the standards of the laws of war previously recognized by the United States.33
This is an important point. To some degree, the use of a harsh standard
by which to judge General Yamashita simply reflects “victor’s justice;” the
idea that the winning side in a war gets to decide who was at fault (and naturally determines that those on the losing side were). America had won a war
that Japan had started, and intended to punish the Japanese, legal niceties
notwithstanding.34 But as we will see, more modern instances of war crimes
courts are not such clear examples of prosecution of the losers by representatives of the state that had been their direct opponent in an armed conflict.
These contemporary tribunals are not so easily chalked up as the revenge of
victorious direct combatants. Thus, I believe that there is more to the story
than just the winning side settling scores. What I think needs to be asked is
to what degree do those establishing the statutes have reason to fear that they
will be subject to the same sets of rules. If the answer is that they do not have
much to fear, then it is likely that they will establish standards more probable
to result in conviction. If, on the other hand, those writing the regulations
have reason to think they could be subject to them, they will establish a higher
requirement for culpability.
The reason this is somewhat different from classic notions of “victor’s
justice” is that as time has gone by, command responsibility has become a
more accepted and better understood concept. Whereas, in the initial Nuremberg trials, Nazi defendants could argue that they were being tried for acts
they had no reason to think would be considered criminal,35 by the time the
Rome Statute was passed in 1998 (a statute that had no retroactive application,36 thereby eliminating the ex post facto concerns that existed at Nuremberg), command responsibility had long since been recognized as a basis for
charges under international law, whether one dated its establishment to the
Fourth Hague Convention, the First Additional Protocol to the 1949 Geneva
Convention,37 or to the case law that emerged from the Yamashita and Nazi
trials, all of which preceded the recent tribunals discussed below. Thus, while
in most of our cases we do not have classic victor’s justice (the Yamashita
trial comes the closest), we do have situations where the side making the rules
33. See Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 35.
34. It was, presumably, no coincidence that Yamashita’s trial concluded on December 7, 1945. See id. at 5.
35. Obviously, this was a hotly disputed contention.
36. See Rome Statute, supra note 5, at art. 24(1).
37. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 42-43,
article 86, reprinted in 16 Int’l Legal Materials 1391, 1428-29; Timothy Wu and Yong-Sung
Kang, Criminal Liability for the Actions of Subordinates – the Doctrine of Command Responsibility and its Analogues in American Law, 38 HARV. INT’L L. J. 272, 276 n.24 (1997).
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considers the risk of being held to those same regulations, with a corresponding impact on how the statutes are written and/or interpreted.
In the case of the victorious American army, conviction of a Japanese
general by procedures set by the American military itself did not present
much risk that these standards would be employed by other countries against
the United States.38 The military did not indicate that it was setting rules that
were intended to apply internationally. Quite the contrary, in fact. As Ryan
describes, the bylaws that were to govern post-war trials against the Japanese
were simply left to the discretion of General MacArthur.39 He issued a series
of orders about these cases, one of which dealt specifically with proceedings
to be undertaken against General Yamashita.40 Thus, the legal standard employed was a creation of MacArthur’s, and a sui generis one at that, specially
designed to target the winner’s defeated opponent.41 It is not surprising that
a guideline created in this manner was prosecution-friendly. Nor was there
likely to have been much concern that its rules would be used against Americans. At the end of a war in which Americans viewed themselves as having
acted virtuously, the possibility that Americans could ever be subject to prosecution for acts (or omissions) similar to those that formed the basis of the
charges against Yamashita must have seemed remote.
Not surprisingly, when Americans were eventually in the position of
being accused of committing war crimes (and, in particular, crimes involving
command responsibility), they were not judged by MacArthur’s rules for
Yamashita. In the aftermath of the My Lai massacre, when US military of38. As Lawrence Rockwood describes in Walking Away from Nuremberg: Just War
and the Doctrine of Command Responsibility, to some degree this may simply be because
violations of the laws of war by the United States were not even reported or prosecuted in the
first place. Rockwood mentions the massacre of several hundred unarmed Korean civilians
early in the Korean War near the villages of Im Ga Ri and Joo Gok Ri. This crime took place
while General MacArthur was the American commander, meaning that he would have been
found liable under any standard at all close to the one applied to General Yamashita. But the
crime was simply covered up. See LAWRENCE P. ROCKWOOD, WALKING AWAY FROM
NUREMBERG: JUST WAR AND THE DOCTRINE OF COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY 96-97 (2007); see
also Benjamin G. Davis, Refluat Stercus: A Citizen’s View of Criminal Prosecution in U.S.
Domestic Courts of High-Level U.S. Civilian Authority and Military Generals for Torture and
Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment, 23 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 503, 552-55
(2008) (describing the events and noting that a US Army investigation of the incident revealed
a “high-level document” stating that the army had a policy of shooting approaching civilians
in South Korea).
39. See RYAN, supra note 15, at 60. So, not only was a member of the losing side
tried by a member of the winning side, a defeated general was tried at the direction of a general
from the winning side who he had faced in battle. Id.
40. See id. at 61.
41. Furthermore, as Ryan points out, MacArthur felt a special affinity for the Philippines (where he had spent much of his life) and its people. Thus, he particularly wanted to be
sure that someone was held to account for what had happened there. See id. at 60.
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ficers were faced with command responsibility charges for offenses committed by American soldiers in Vietnam, the military justice system employed a
much less prosecution-friendly standard than that which had been used to
convict General Yamashita. While Lieutenant William Calley was convicted
for his role in the atrocities, he had taken direct part in the killings. His superior, Captain Ernest Medina, was acquitted of a command responsibility
charge after his court-martial judge instructed the jurors that the prosecution
would have to meet an actual knowledge standard (as opposed to knew or
should have known) in order to convict.42 Also escaping charges were the
most senior leaders of the brigade and division.43
As Michael Smidt notes, the main reason that Medina’s case was evaluated under an actual knowledge standard was that he was only charged with
violating the Uniform Code of Military Justice, and not with violating international law.44 Which is to say, while the United States prosecuted Japanese
and German defendants for violations of international law for committing
war crimes, when it came to American soldiers alleged to have massacred
civilians (or failed to stop such massacres by their subordinates), the defendants were not even charged with, much less convicted of, breaking international law.
Thus, the American case is perhaps an extreme example of the more
general point: the criteria a tribunal establishes for command responsibility
are likely to bear some relationship to the chance that those writing the guidelines have reason to believe the standards could be used against them in the
future. If the chance is slim, then the rule makers will be happy to create an
easy to meet threshold for command responsibility. If the chance is greater,
then the crime will be correspondingly harder to prosecute. The Medina trial
also demonstrates a corollary to this principle, which we will see further examples of below: another way to avoid the risk of conviction, regardless of
the substance of the law in question, is simply to exempt yourself from the
law’s coverage to begin with.
NUREMBERG: TWO CASES
While the most notable Nuremberg defendants were senior Nazi leaders, people such as Hermann Göring, Joachim von Ribbentrop, and Albert
Speer, who were held responsible for the planning and carrying out of some

42. See PETERS, supra note 17, at 178; see also Michael L. Smidt, Yamashita, Medina
and Beyond: Command Responsibility in Contemporary Military Order, 164 MIL. L. REV.
155, 193 (2000) (discussing the judge’s trial instructions).
43. See PETERS, supra note 17, at 178.
44. See Smidt, supra note 42, at 194-95.
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of the more notorious of the Nazi crimes,45 there were also some prosecutions
that invoked a concept of command responsibility. These cases, however,
took place as a supplement to the main Nuremberg trials. Unlike the prosecutions jointly brought by the four allied powers (the US, the Soviet Union,
Great Britain, and France), the two command responsibility prosecutions
were brought by American prosecutors as part of a series of cases known as
the Subsequent Nuremberg Proceedings, and the cases were heard in front of
a panel of American judges.46 The two command responsibility cases from
this group were United States v. von Leeb (the “High Command Case”), and
United States v. List (the “Hostage Case”).
Wilhelm von Leeb and his thirteen47 co-defendants were described as
“former high-ranking officers in the German Army and Navy, and officers
holding high positions in the German High Command (OKW).”48 They were
charged with crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.49 As Valerie Hébert points out, the US viewed “the crime of aggressive
war [as] the supreme crime,”50 thus some of the charges pertained to the fact
of Germany’s invasion of other countries in the first place, wholly apart from
the sorts of crimes that are commonplace in war and that are closer to what
we now think of as war crimes (killing or abusing civilians, mistreatment of
POWs, etc.). The reasoning behind this was the belief that “the problem of
war crimes had to be attacked at its root: aggressive war.”51 Some of the
charges against the High Command defendants related to the German decision to invade the Soviet Union, known as Operation Barbarossa. The prosecution introduced evidence that several of the defendants had been in attendance at a meeting with Hitler in which he outlined the plan for the invasion, which was “to be a total war of destruction.”52
Other charges pertained to transgressions more akin to conventional war
crimes: the Commissar Order, by which certain Red Army soldiers were to
be executed immediately upon capture, rather than taken prisoner,53 and the
Commando Order, which similarly called for the immediate execution of Allied soldiers captured while in the midst of “special missions,”54 were each
45. Göring and von Ribbentrop received death sentences; Speer pled guilty and was
sentenced to twenty years.
46. See VALERIE GENEVIÈVE HÉBERT, HITLER’S GENERALS ON TRIAL 1 (2010).
47. One of whom committed suicide during the trial. See U.N. War Crimes Comm’n,
Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, Vol. XII at 1 (1949) [hereinafter Reports of Trials,
Vol. XII].
48. Id.
49. See id.
50. HÉBERT, supra note 46, at 1.
51. Id. at 72.
52. Id. at 77.
53. See id. at 79.
54. See id. at 79-80.
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sources of charges. Additionally, there were orders to kill civilians in towns
the Germans wanted cleared,55 as well as directives dealing specifically with
the treatment of Jews and Romani.56
Whereas in the other cases discussed in this Article, the question was
whether, and to what degree, a given superior was responsible for actions
taken by subordinates acting to some respect of their own accord, here there
were actual orders from senior military officers to commit violations of international law. Under these circumstances, the issue for the tribunal was figuring out the extent of an officer’s guilt for giving a particular order, or passing along an order given by a superior. Professor Hébert writes that “[f]or
staff officers, guilt was relatively simple to identify: these were the men who
composed and disseminated flagrantly criminal orders . . . . As for field commanders . . . they did not enact these orders themselves. However, by virtue
of their rank, they were held responsible.”57
The court also attempted to evaluate how much responsibility could be
attributed to a particular local commander, and how much should be placed
on forces outside the military chain of command, i.e. “the state.” It explained
that
it must be borne in mind that a military commander,
whether it be of an occupied territory or otherwise,
is subject both to the orders of his military superiors
and the state itself as to his jurisdiction and functions. He is their agent and instrument for certain
purposes in a position from which they can remove
him at will.58
The purportedly authoritative position of non-military officials contrasted the
case from Yamashita, in which there was no non-military Japanese authority
in the Philippines to speak of.59
The Hostage Case centered around reprisals against civilians in Nazioccupied territories.60 As with the High Command Case, the defendants were
senior Nazi officers.61 The indictment stated that the defendants had issued

43.

55.
56.
57.
58.

See VALERIE GENEVIÈVE HÉBERT, HITLER’S GENERALS ON TRIAL 89 (2010).
See id. at 91-94.
Id. at 67.
Reports of Trials, Vol. XII, supra note 47, at 76; see also Parks, supra note 8, at

59. See Reports of Trials, Vol. XII, supra note 47, at 544-45; see also Parks, supra
note 8, at 43.
60. See U.N. War Crimes Comm’n, Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, Vol. XI,
at 759 [hereinafter Reports of Trials, Vol. XI].
61. See Parks, supra note 8, at 58, n.196. And as with the High Command Case, one
of the defendants committed suicide during the course of the proceedings. See id.; see also
Reports of Trials, Vol. XI, supra note 60, at 759.
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orders which had resulted in the deaths of thousands of civilians, as well as
looting, “wanton destruction” of towns, refusal of quarter to enemy soldiers,
and deportations to concentration camps, all in violation of the Hague Convention of 1907.62 As an example of the charges, defendant List was alleged
to have personally received orders from Hitler pertaining to the suppression
of resistance movements in areas held by the Nazis.63 These orders included
large scale reprisals for the deaths of any German soldiers, on the order of
fifty or even one hundred to one.64
Part of the defense asserted that the defendants had been unaware of
some of the reports of crimes committed by their subordinates: “We have
been confronted repeatedly with contentions that reports and orders sent to
the defendants did not come to their attention. Responsibility for acts charged
as crimes have been denied because of absence from headquarters at the time
of their commission.”65 But the court rejected this, maintaining that the German Army was well enough equipped to allow for communication even when
a commander was away from headquarters.66
In both of these cases, the issues of command responsibility were tied
up with claims of superior orders.67 That is, the tribunals were simultaneously
trying to determine the liability of individuals who may have given illegal
orders as well as received them. But the judges were largely unsympathetic
to defenses based on superior orders. In the first instance, a local commander
was responsible for the acts of subordinates in the area: “The commanding
general of occupied territory having executive authority as well as military
command, will not be heard to say that a unit taking unlawful orders from
someone other than himself, was responsible for the crime and that he is
thereby absolved from responsibility.”68 And with regard to a claim based on
superior orders, the Hostage tribunal ruled that this was not a legitimate defense to carrying out illegal actions, that the rejection of this defense was a
position “adopted by civilized nations extensively.”69 Similarly, the High
Command court stated that

62. See U.N. War Crimes Comm’n, Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, Vol.
VIII, at 35-36 [hereinafter Reports of Trials, Vol. VIII].
63. See id. at 38-39.
64. See id. at 39. As Parks notes, wholly apart from the command responsibility aspects of the case, the Hostage Case is best known as a trial on the law of reprisal. See Parks,
supra note 8, at 59.
65. See Parks, supra note 8, at 59; see also Reports of Trials, Vol. XI, supra note 60,
at 1259.
66. See Reports of Trials, Vol. XI, supra note 60, at 1259-60; see also Parks, supra
note 8, at 59.
67. See Reports of Trials, Vol. VIII, supra note 62, at 50.
68. See id. at 69.
69. Id. at 50.
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Under such circumstances to recognize as a defense
. . . that a defendant acted pursuant to the order of
his government or of a superior would be in practical effect to say that all the guilt charged in the Indictment was the guilt of Hitler alone . . . . To recognize such a contention would be to recognize an
absurdity.70
In the end, both courts reached somewhat mixed verdicts: some charges
were upheld, some were not, while some defendants were acquitted outright.
In the High Command case, two defendants were acquitted, while the rest
were sentenced to terms ranging from time served to life imprisonment.71
Similarly, in the Hostage Case, two defendants were acquitted, with the others convicted and sentenced to terms up to life imprisonment.72 No one was
sentenced to death, as Yamashita had been. Eventually, those convicted were
released early on a variety of grounds; by 1955, none of the defendants from
either case remained in prison. Professor Hébert points out that most of these
releases were undertaken as a means of cementing good relations between
the US and West Germany (an especially pressing concern during the early
years of the Cold War), rather than out of a sense that the paroles were justified in their own right.73
Why did the German cases have such different verdicts than Yamashita’s? Given the facts as they have been presented, it would be easy to make
the case that the Nazi defendants, many of whom specifically gave or carried
out illegal orders, were more culpable than Yamashita had been (after all, he
had not been accused of ordering atrocities),74 with even more serious consequences. So why were they treated more leniently? Several explanations
present themselves. First is the passage of time: Yamashita’s trial began in
the Fall of 1945, when the signatures on Japan’s surrender papers were hardly
dry. By contrast, the two German trials began in 1947, more than two years
after V-E Day. Perhaps this allowed for tempers to cool a bit.
Secondly, the Nazi cases were heard by civilian legal professionals, rather than military officers. Of the six people who made up the two panels,
70. Reports of Trials, Vol XII, supra note 47, at 71.
71. See id. at 95. The two who were sentenced to life imprisonment were found not
only to have enforced some of the illegal orders, but to have played roles in creating them as
well. See HÉBERT, supra note 46, at 153.
72. See Reports of Trials, Vol. VIII, supra note 62, at 76.
73. See HÉBERT, supra note 46, at 155 (“[T]he necessary prerequisite for any [West
German] contribution to the defense of the West was the restoration of German military honor.
This required . . . the release of all military men convicted of war crimes.”).
74. See ALLAN A. RYAN, YAMASHITA’S GHOST: WAR CRIMES, MACARTHUR’S
JUSTICE, AND COMMAND ACCOUNTABILITY 65 (2012).
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five were judges and one an experienced practitioner.75 This greater training
may well have benefitted the defendants, as their cases were heard by individuals trained to make careful analyses of legal principles and to take defense arguments seriously.76 It need hardly be added that the fact that these
six lawyers were not part of a command structure including General MacArthur was an advantage to the defendants.
Finally, racism may have played a role in the harsher treatment of Yamashita. In the words of John Dower, “[i]n the United States and Britain, the
Japanese were more hated than the Germans before as well as after Pearl
Harbor.”77 It is not surprising that the greater negativity toward the Japanese
that existed in the general population would be reflected amongst the military
officers deciding Yamashita’s fate, as well as on the Supreme Court. Thus,
Yamashita may simply have faced a higher level of animosity when on trial
than did the Nazi officers.
While perhaps not handling the German defendants as severely as the
military court had treated Yamashita, the tribunals still held the Nazi officers
to standards that would not be applied to American servicemen at My Lai
two decades later. Again, the My Lai court imposed an actual knowledge
requirement but the Hostage tribunal rejected a defense claim that German
officers could not be held responsible if they were not at Headquarters to
receive word of illegal orders.78 Thus, as with the trial of General Yamashita,
an American court applied a rule to judge (and, for the most part, convict)
non-American defendants that would not serve as a binding precedent on
American actions.
In the aftermath of the World War II trials, Additional Protocol I to the
1949 Geneva Convention attempted to codify command responsibility in international law. Article 86 of the protocol states:
75. The High Command Tribunal consisted of Presiding Judge John C. Young, former Chief Justice of the Colorado Supreme Court, Judge Winfield Hale of the Tennessee Court
of Appeals, and Judge Justin Harding, formerly of the US District Court for the District of
Alaska. See Parks, supra note 8, at 38. The Hostage Case was heard in front of Presiding Judge
Charles F. Wennerstrum of the Iowa Supreme Court, Judge Edward F. Carter of the Nebraska
Supreme Court, and George J. Burke, a practitioner and former prosecutor from Michigan.
See id. at 59 n.198; see also William B. Treml, Burke Family Law Legacy to Continue, ANN
ARBOR
NEWS,
Aug.
30,
1986,
http://oldnews.aadl.org/taxonomy/term/8169
[https://perma.cc/GX8Q-4EP8].
76. See Parks, supra note 8, at 64 (“The High Command and Hostage cases are of
greater value than Yamashita in that the respective opinions rendered therein are the product
of judicial minds rather than of lay jurors, and prepared under less emotive circumstances; the
blaze of war had died sufficiently to permit juristic scholarship providing necessary light for
future interpretation rather than mere heat.”).
77. JOHN W. DOWER, WAR WITHOUT MERCY: RACE AND POWER IN THE PACIFIC WAR
8 (1986); see generally id. at 77-93 (discussing virulence of racially based attitudes towards
the Japanese, in contrast to views of Germans).
78. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
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1. The High Contracting Parties and the Parties to
the Conflict shall repress grave breaches, and take
measures necessary to suppress all other breaches,
of the Conventions or of this Protocol which result
from a failure to act when under a duty to do so.
2. The fact that a breach of the Conventions or of
this Protocol was committed by a subordinate does
not absolve his superiors from penal or disciplinary
responsibility, as the case may be, if they knew, or
had information that should have enabled them to
conclude in the circumstances at the time, that he
was committing or was going to commit such a
breach and if they did not take all feasible measures
within their power to prevent or repress the
breach. 79
Article 87 adds to this, with a specific reference to the duties of commanders:
1. The High Contracting Parties and the Parties to
the conflict shall require military commanders, with
respect to members of the armed forces under their
command and other persons under their control, to
prevent and, where necessary, to suppress and report to competent authorities breaches of the Conventions and of this Protocol.80
As we will see below, this language, especially from the second paragraph of Article 86, would find its way (at least in part) into several of the
statutes for future tribunals.

79. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 42-43, article
86, reprinted in 16 Int’l Legal Materials 1391, 1428-29 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I]
(The English and French versions of this provision do not completely match up, leading to
some disagreement about the actual terms of this provision); see Timothy Wu and Yong-Sung
Kang, Criminal Liability for the Actions of Subordinates – the Doctrine of Command Responsibility and its Analogues in American Law, 38 HARV. INT’L L. J. 272, 276 n.24 (1997) (discussing International Committee of the Red Cross Commentary on the Protocol) (internal citation omitted) (The US has not ratified this Protocol).
80. Additional Protocol I, supra note 79, at article 87(1).
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ICTY: MIXED SIGNALS
In the early 1990s, as reports of the growing humanitarian crisis in the
former Yugoslavia became increasingly prominent, the UN Security Council
responded with a series of resolutions.81 The first of these, Resolution 764,
passed on July 13, 1992, noted that all parties to the fighting were bound to
comply with their commitments under International Humanitarian Law
(IHL), and stated that those who ordered or committed grave breaches of the
Geneva Conventions would be held individually responsible for their actions.82 This would be followed a month later by Resolution 771, which condemned continuing violations of IHL and demanded that all parties observe
their IHL obligations.83 771 also called upon member states to collect information they had pertaining to IHL violations and to make that information
available to the Security Council.84
This resolution was followed in short order by Resolution 780, which
called for an “impartial Commission of Experts” that would “examine and
analyse” the information gathered pursuant to 771.85 Once established, the
Commission quickly issued an interim report, noting the massive human
rights violations taking place in the former Yugoslavia, and raising the prospect of a criminal tribunal to prosecute the wrongdoers.86 Finally, in February 1993, the Security Council passed resolution 808, which established just
such a tribunal, what came to be known as ICTY.87
Resolution 808 called upon the Secretary-General’s office to submit
proposals for the creation of the new court.88 It did so, and suggested a proposed governing statute for ICTY. The Secretary-General’s report was
adopted, without change, in Resolution 827, passed on May 25, 1993.89 It
had taken barely a year from the first Security Council resolution to the establishment of a whole new international tribunal. By UN standards, this was
remarkably quick. As Morris and Scharf tell it, there was more debate about

81. See, e.g., MICHAEL P. SCHARF & WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC ON
TRIAL: A COMPANION (2002); VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, AN INSIDER’S GUIDE
TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, VOL. I (1995).
82. S.C. Res. 764, ¶ 10 (July 13, 1992).
83. S.C. Res. 771, ¶ 2-3 (Aug. 13, 1992).
84. See id. at ¶ 5.
85. S.C. Res. 780, ¶ 2 (Oct. 6, 1992).
86. See MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 81, at 28-29.
87. See S.C. Res. 808, ¶ 1 (Feb. 22, 1993).
88. See id. at ¶ 2.
89. See S.C. Res. 827 (May 25, 1993).
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the creation of the Commission of Experts in Resolution 78090 than there was
about what became ICTY’s governing rules.91
Surely at least part of the reason for the Council’s ability to move expeditiously was the fact that the Secretary-General’s report “clearly distinguished the Security Council’s decision to establish an ad hoc tribunal of
limited scope and purpose from the efforts . . . to establish a permanent international criminal court.”92 In other words, Council members could afford
to move swiftly and decisively because they were creating rules to apply to
someone else, not to themselves, at least initially. Since ICTY would be a
creation of the Security Council, and because it was the first major war
crimes tribunal since Nuremberg, there was certainly the possibility that its
rulings would have precedential value beyond the former Yugoslavia.93 Perhaps not surprising for a UN creation, the tribunal would meet in The Hague,
rather than in the directly affected lands.
The ICTY statute contains the following language on command responsibility:
The fact that any of the acts referred to in articles 2
to 5 of the present Statute [these articles set out a
list of crimes the tribunal intended to prosecute, including grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions
of 1949, violations of the laws or customs of war,
genocide, and crimes against humanity] was committed by a subordinate does not relieve his superior
of criminal responsibility if he knew or had reason
to know that the subordinate was about to commit
such acts or had done so and the superior failed to
take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators
thereof.94
This is fairly straightforward language. A superior can be held responsible if s/he a) knew or should have known that subordinates were about to
commit any of the listed crimes; or b) had already committed them; and c)
the superior either failed to take necessary steps to prevent the crimes; or d)
did not punish the perpetrators post hoc. It is close to, though not exactly the
90. See MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 81, at 25 (describing the debate as “particularly acrimonious.”).
91. See id. at 33 (noting “a strong hesitancy to open the draft statute to modification.”).
92. Id. (internal citation omitted).
93. And it appears that ICTY’s rulings have been influential in other fora. See infra
notes 220-51 and 281-84 and accompanying text.
94. ICTY Statute, supra note 2, at article 7(3).
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same as, the language from Geneva Additional Protocol I quoted above:
“knew or had reason to know” (ICTY) vs. “knew or had information which
should have enabled them to conclude” (Geneva).95
It is interesting to consider whether Yamashita could have won his case
under this standard. If one accepts the factual premise of Murphy’s dissent
and Yamashita’s own claims at trial, then even if Yamashita knew that his
soldiers were about to (or had) committed horrible atrocities (and probably
would until they were killed or captured), it would likely have been impossible for him to have taken any “necessary steps” to prevent or punish these
crimes, given the deteriorating military conditions for the Japanese. Arguably, the provision imposes a strict liability standard: a commander is obligated to take “necessary and reasonable measures.” Yamashita might well
have responded that there was nothing he could “reasonably” have done (and
it is almost certainly the case that the standard – prosecution friendly as it
was to begin with – was in some respects irrelevant: Yamashita was going to
be convicted, no matter what).
There are two cases worth exploring from ICTY: the Tadić decision and
the combined Kordić and Čerkez ruling. Tadić is not a command responsibility case, but it provides some useful context to the tribunal’s overall operations.
Duško Tadić was charged with having personally committed a large
number of crimes, including torture, rape, and murder.96 This case is important in this discussion because of one of the legal issues the case raised,
and how the court addressed it. Prosecuting Tadić was complicated by the
fact that though he was an ethnic Serb, he was of Bosnian nationality, as were
his victims. Because of this shared nationality, a case could be made that his
victims did not qualify as “protected persons” for purposes of the Geneva
Conventions, and the conflict would not be considered an international armed
conflict.97 The prosecution maintained that there was a sufficiently strong
link between the armed forces of the rump Serbian republic, Republica
Srpska, in which Tadić served, and the Yugoslavian (i.e. Serbian) army, so
as to make the conflict in effect between Bosnia and Serbia.98
How to resolve this question? At the time of the decision, the leading
case on whether Country A could be considered to have sufficient control
over irregular forces in Country B to turn a seemingly internal conflict between Country B and its rebels into an international conflict between Country
95. The Geneva Additional Protocol also has language calling on commanders to
punish those responsible post hoc, if atrocities have been committed. See Additional Protocol
I, supra note 79, at article 87(3).
96. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Trial Chamber, ¶ 9 (Int’l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997).
97. See id. at ¶ 578.
98. See id. at ¶ 584.
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A and Country B was an International Court of Justice (ICJ) decision, Nicaragua v. United States.99 In this case, Nicaragua sued the United States over
American support for the Contras. In its ruling, the ICJ held that in order to
transform the Nicaraguan government’s fight with the Contras into an international armed conflict with the US, it would have to be demonstrated that
the US exercised “effective control” over the Contras (which the court then
went onto say had not been shown).100
The “effective control” standard seemed to establish a fairly high
(though not impossible) standard to meet, and in fact, the Trial Chamber
found that the threshold had not been satisfied.101 As a result, Tadić’s victims
could not be considered “protected persons.”102 However, when the case
reached the appellate level, the Appeals Chamber rejected the ICJ benchmark
and ruled that a showing of “overall control” would be sufficient (which it
then ruled had been established).103 The court explained that “a State must be
held accountable for acts of its organs”104 and that “the whole body of international law on State responsibility is based on a realistic concept of accountability.”105 In the current situation, if an “organized group” is “under the overall control of a State, it must perforce engage the responsibility of that State
for its activities.”106
As to the ICJ’s “effective control” standard, the ICTY panel explained
that “the degree of control may, however, vary according to the factual circumstances of each case. The Appeals Chamber fails to see why in each and
every circumstance international law should require a high threshold for the
test of control. Rather, various situations may be distinguished.”107 Thus, this
incident specific court was willing to contradict the broader mandate ICJ to
issue a ruling that would make it easier to convict those brought in front of
it, thereby suggesting that the specialized nature of the tribunal might be leading to a more prosecution-friendly jurisprudence.
However, when ICTY subsequently heard a command responsibility
case, in the combined Kordić and Čerkez ruling it did not continue on this
path, instead reverting to the use of “effective control” when ruling on the
responsibility of individuals for criminal acts under the theory of command
99. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14 (June 27).
100. Id. at ¶ 115.
101. See Tadić, No. IT-94-1-T, at ¶ 607.
102. See id. at ¶ 608.
103. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Chamber, ¶ 122 (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 1997).
104. Id. at ¶ 121.
105. Id.
106. Id. at ¶ 122.
107. Id. at ¶ 117 (emphasis in original).
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responsibility.108 Dario Kordić and Mario Čerkez were Croats charged with
a large number of crimes against Bosnian Muslims, including murder, inhuman treatment, use of human shields, pillaging, and destruction of religious
institutions.109 Applying the “effective control” benchmark, the trial chamber
found that Čerkez, but not Kordić, had sufficient commander responsibilities
to be found liable under the command responsibility provision of the ICTY
statute.110
In going back to the effective control standard the court relied on the
ruling of an earlier ICTY trial of four defendants, known collectively as the
Čelebići defendants (for the prison camp at which the crimes were committed), which had also employed the effective control standard.111 Thus, the
new ground broken in Tadić did not translate into a reconsideration of the
effective control standard for command responsibility, even though a specialized court like ICTY revealed itself to be willing to apply more prosecution friendly guidelines in a different setting.
ICTR: AKAYESU, MUSEMA, AND EXTENDING THE NOTION OF
“COMMANDER”
The Rwanda tribunal, like its Yugoslavian counterpart, was a creation
of the Security Council, in this case Resolution 955.112 As with Resolution
827, which established ICTY, ICTR was established relatively quickly after
the onset of atrocities and was also the culmination of a (by UN standards)
rapid fire series of Security Council resolutions on the deteriorating situation
in Rwanda. Resolution 812, passed on March 12, 1993, called for a ceasefire between the Rwandan military and the forces of the Rwandese Patriotic
Front.113 Eight hundred and twelve would be followed by Resolution 846 in
June,114 872 in October (which established a peacekeeping operation),115 and
891 in December.116

108. Prosecutor v. Kordić and Čerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2- T, Trial Chamber, ¶ 415
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 26, 2001) (On appeal, the prosecution did
not even challenge this portion of the Trial Chamber’s ruling); see Prosecutor v. Kordić and
Čerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2- A, Appeals Chamber, ¶ 826 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Dec. 17, 2004)).
109. See Kordić and Čerkez, Trial Chamber, at ¶ 6.
110. See id. at ¶¶ 841, 843.
111. Prosecutor v. Delalić, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Trial Chamber, ¶ 378 (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 1998).
112. S.C. Res. 955 (Nov. 8, 1994).
113. S.C. Res. 812 (Mar. 12, 1993).
114. S.C. Res. 846 (June 22, 1993).
115. S.C. Res. 872 (Oct. 4, 1993).
116. S.C. Res. 891 (Dec. 20, 1993).
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By April 1994, as the situation worsened, the Council stated in Resolution 912 that it was “appalled” at the “large-scale violence in Rwanda.”117 On
May 13, the Secretary-General issued a report on the situation,118 which
would promptly be followed by Resolution 918, which “strongly condemn[ed]” the ongoing violence119 and imposed an arms embargo on
Rwanda.120 Shortly thereafter, on May 31, the Secretary-General issued another report, this one advocating an investigation of the situation in Rwanda
in order to assess responsibility for the manifest violations of international
law.121 On July 1, Resolution 935 called for a Commission of Experts – similar to the one requested pertaining to the former Yugoslavia in Resolution
780 – that would examine the relevant evidence.122 Finally, on November 8,
the Council passed Resolution 955, which established ICTR.123 Less than two
years had passed from the Council’s first resolution on Rwanda, and less than
a year since the genocide had begun in earnest.
As with ICTY, the Council established a tribunal that would not be held
in the country where the atrocities occurred, instead being set up in Arusha,
Tanzania. The rules it operated under were similar to ICTY’s, perhaps not
surprising given how close in time the two courts were created. ICTR’s provision on command responsibility matched the language from ICTY cited
above.124
There are two command responsibility decisions from ICTR that bear
examination, both involving civilians. The first, and more well-known case,
is that of Jean-Paul Akayesu, while the second is the prosecution of Alfred
Musema.
There is nothing in the aforementioned command responsibility language that explicitly limits it to members of the military. The statute speaks
of “superior” and “subordinates,” designations which exist outside the military context. And yet as an intuitive matter, the doctrine seems to address
military, rather than civilian relationships. For one thing, members of the
military are more likely to have the capacity to carry out large scale atrocities.
For another, such crimes tend to occur during situations of military conflict,
when the affected area, to the extent that there is a governing force at all, may

117. S.C. Res. 912 (Apr. 21, 1994).
118. U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in
Rwanda (May 13, 1994).
119. S.C. Res. 918 (May 17, 1994).
120. See id. at ¶ 13.
121. U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in
Rwanda, U.N. Doc. S/1994/640 (May 31, 1994).
122. S.C. Res. 935, para. 1 (July 1, 1994).
123. S.C. Res. 955, para. 1 (Nov. 8, 1994).
124. See S.C. Res. 955, art. 6(3) (Nov. 8, 1994).
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well be under some form of military control.125 Finally, and perhaps most
importantly, the nature of superior-subordinate relationships tend to be very
different in the military than in civilian life: in general, military superiors
exert far more authority over their subordinates than do their civilian counterparts. In light of this, it may make more sense to hold those superiors responsible for the actions of the people over whom they wield this greater
level of control to a degree that we would not when it comes to civilian superior-subordinate relationships.
Thus, extending the concept of command responsibility to civilian relationships is a largely new development. As one writer has pointed out, it cannot be claimed that application of superior (i.e. civilian) responsibility is a
norm of customary international law.126 In its Akayesu ruling, the ICTR Trial
Chamber was clearly aware of the fact that it was treading on relatively new
ground. It wrote, “The Chamber . . . finds that in the case of civilians, the
application of the principle of individual criminal responsibility, enshrined
in Article 6 (3), to civilians remains contentious.”127
Still, Akayesu might have seemed a good candidate for the court to test
this new extension of the command responsibility doctrine. He was the
bourgmestre of his commune, a position roughly equivalent to a mayor.128
As such, he had command of local law enforcement and was the chief executive official in the area.129 Under these circumstances, perhaps it would not
have appeared to be such a huge leap to extend command responsibility coverage. But the court ruled that the prosecution had not proven a superiorsubordinate relationship between Akayesu and local forces that committed
atrocities in the area.130 As a result, it refused to convict him under the command responsibility portion of the statute (though he was convicted of several
charges for direct participation131 and is currently serving a life sentence).
125. Though, as referenced above, the Nuremberg tribunal considered the issue of
whether a military commander had control over a certain area, or whether “the state” itself
might exercise some degree of control. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
126. See Yaël Ronen, Superior Responsibility of Civilians for International Crimes
Committed in Civilian Settings, 43 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 313, 316 (2010). Again, this contrasts it from command responsibility in the military context, which was established as a crime
under customary international law before ICTR came into being. See, e.g., Delalić, Case No.
IT-96-21-T, Trial Chamber, at ¶¶ 333-343. It is instructive to note that among the sources that
the ICTY trial chamber relied on in reaching this conclusion when trying the Čelebići defendants were the US Army Field Manual and the British Manual of Military Law. See id. at ¶ 341.
This underscores the point that command responsibility was initially primarily thought of as
something that applied to military commanders.
127. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T,
Judgment, ¶ 491 (Sept. 2, 1998).
128. See id. at ¶ 3.
129. See id. at ¶ 4.
130. See id. at ¶ 691.
131. See id. at ¶ 179.
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The court’s hesitancy to extend command responsibility to cover a civilian in Akayesu makes its ruling in Musema all the more surprising. Unlike
Akayesu, Musema was convicted both for personally participating in atrocities and on a command responsibility theory.132 But Musema was even more
of a civilian than Akayesu: he was not a government official; he did not control a law enforcement force, much less military troops. Instead, he managed
a tea factory.133
To be fair, “managed a tea factory” understates things a bit. Musema
received this position by presidential decree.134 There were other indications
that he had at least some political influence, and was not merely an anonymous middle manager in a random plant. The ICTR Trial Chamber described
him as a “socially and politically prominent person.”135 It was because of this
alleged special prominence that he was thought to have more than usual influence over his subordinates.136 It was also the case that in Rwanda, a relatively high percentage of the killings were carried out by civilians, as opposed
to the military.137 And at a minimum, there was strong evidence that Musema
had not only personally participated in atrocities, but had incited employees
of the tea factory to do so as well.138 Still, his ability to “command” anyone
appeared to be considerably less than that of Akayesu, given Akayesu’s admission that he “had the power to assemble the population and that they
obeyed his instructions,”139 or the court’s description of the bourgmestre as
“the most powerful figure in the commune.”140 For whatever reason, the court
in Musema took a broader view of command responsibility and civilians than
it had previously taken in Akayesu.
The Musema decision moved the law significantly in a new direction.141
More than that, the idea that civilians are liable to be prosecuted on command
132. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Musema, Int’l Crim. Trib. of Rwanda, Case No. ICTR96-13-T, Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 936 (Jan. 27, 2000).
133. See id. at ¶ 12.
134. See Cécile Aptel & Jamie A. Williamson, Case Note, Prosecutor v. Musema:
A Commentary on the Musema Judgment Rendered by the United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 1 MELB. J. INT’L L. 131, 132 (2000).
135. See Musema, No. ICTR-96-13-T, at ¶ 140.
136. See Musema, No. ICTR-96-13-T, at ¶ 894.
137. See Sean Libby, Comment, [D]effective Control: Problems Arising From the Application of Non-Military Command Responsibility by the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda, 23 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 201, 202 (2009) (internal citation omitted).
138. See, e.g., Musema, No. ICTR-96-13-T, at ¶ 890 (finding that he had “led and
participated in an attack”).
139. See Akayesu, No. ICTR-96-4-T, at ¶ 704.
140. Id. at ¶ 2.
141. See Ronen, supra note 126, at 324-25 (noting that ICTY prosecutions against civilians on command responsibility charges were unsuccessful, even though they involved civilians leading militias, rather than a more conventional civilian superior-subordinate relationship).
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responsibility charges could greatly broaden the number and types of individuals who might find themselves in front of an international tribunal, even
if in the immediate circumstance the ruling only affected the citizens of one
particular country. It is fair to wonder whether a tribunal whose mandate was
broader than individuals involved in one, and only one, conflict would have
been so willing to extend the law’s coverage in this manner.
CREATION OF THE ICC
Unlike ICTY and ICTR, which were established in rapid fashion and in
response to discrete events, the International Criminal Court was a long time
in formation. Proposals for some sort of international criminal tribunal date
back at least as far as the turn of the twentieth century.142 Not surprisingly,
both world wars spurred discussion of the idea of having a permanent international criminal court of some sort,143 as did the creation of the UN.144 In
1948, during the UN’s infancy, the General Assembly passed Resolution
260, which invited the International Law Commission (ILC) “to study the
desirability and possibility of establishing an international judicial organ for
the trial of persons charged with genocide or other crimes over which jurisdiction will be conferred upon that organization by international conventions.”145 One possibility would have been to create a criminal docket within
the ICJ, but the ILC recommended against this.146
It is not necessary here to trace the entire history of the formation of the
ICC, but one point that is worth emphasizing is simply how long the whole
process took. Even the first draft proposals for the court were not submitted
until the early 1950s–which is to say that it took longer to produce initial
drafts for the ICC than it did for ICTY and ICTR to be established from the
time of the first Security Council resolutions on the situations in the former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda, respectively. Also, the drafts were hardly the end
of the process. By the time the Rome Statute was finalized, on July 17, 1998,
just short of a half-century had elapsed since Resolution 260.147

142. See Christopher L. Blakesley, Obstacles to the Creation of a Permanent War
Crimes Tribunal, FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF., Summer/Fall 1994, at 77, 82.
143. See id. at 82-83; see also Joel Cavicchia, The Prospects for an International Criminal Court in the 1990s, 10 DICK J. INT’L L. 223, 225-26 (1992).
144. See id. at 226-27.
145. G.A. Res. 260 (III), U.N. Doc. A/RES/3/260 (Dec. 9, 1948); see also Cavicchia,
supra note 143, at 227.
146. See Cavicchia, supra note 143, at 227 (quoting G.A. Res. 260 (III), U.N. Doc.
A/RES/3/260 (Dec. 9, 1948)).
147. Even then the ICC was not quite finalized, as the Rome Statute left unsettled the
definition of “aggression,” one of the crimes under the new court’s jurisdiction. See Rome
Statute, supra note 5, at art. 5(2).
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It should not be surprising that it took this long to produce the Rome
Statute. It sought to create something unprecedented–a criminal court to
which all the world’s peoples would be subject, perhaps even against the
wishes of a given defendant’s home government. Furthermore, the Rome
Statute gives the ICC the power to investigate not only crimes committed in
the course of an international armed conflict, but those perpetrated on a
purely internal basis, i.e. by a government against its own nationals. Getting
approval for a court with this type of jurisdiction would naturally be a major
challenge for a world order steeped in notions of individual state autonomy.
In the end, concerns over infringements on sovereignty proved to be too
much for several important players on the world scene, including both China
and the U.S., neither of which have ratified the Rome Statute.148
The ICC’s creation, and the refusal of countries like China and America
to ratify it, stands in stark contrast to the formation of both ICTY and ICTR.
The two country-specific tribunals were formed by a smaller body (the Security Council) in a relatively brief timeframe, with a mandate limited to a
specific set of events, as opposed to the ICC, whose jurisdiction would be
much wider. With ICTY and ICTR, the most directly affected governments–
Serbia and Rwanda–did not have the choice of opting out of the tribunals
established for their countries.
ICC IN PRACTICE: COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY LANGUAGE AND THE BEMBA
RULING
Working from the theory that tribunals will be more pro-prosecution
when the affected parties have little or no say in their creation suggests that
the ICC should have had extremely high standards for command responsibility convictions. Since every country involved could theoretically find one of
its nationals (and, perhaps especially, its leaders or senior officials) facing
prosecution, these same countries would be wary of making it too easy to
prosecute. Contrary to initial expectations, the statute contains some strong
language on command responsibility. Article 28 reads as follows:
In addition to other grounds of criminal responsibility under this Statute for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court:
(a) A military commander or person effectively
acting as a military commander shall be criminally
responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction of the
Court committed by forces under his or her effective
148. The States Parties to the Rome Statute, INT’L CRIM. CT. (last visited Feb. 22,
2018), https://asp.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/asp/states%20parties/pages/the%20states%20parties%20to%20the%20rome%20statute.aspx.
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command and control, or effective authority and
control as the case may be, as a result of his or her
failure to exercise control properly over such forces,
where:
(i)
That military commander or person either
knew or, owing to the circumstances at the time,
should have known that the forces were committing
or about to commit such crimes; and
(ii) That military commander or person failed to
take all necessary and reasonable measures within
his or her power to prevent or repress their commission or to submit the matter to the competent authorities for investigation and prosecution.
(b) With respect to superior and subordinate relationships not described in paragraph (a), a superior
shall be criminally responsible for crimes within the
jurisdiction of the Court committed by subordinates
under his or her effective authority and control, as a
result of his or her failure to exercise control
properly over such subordinates, where:
(i) The superior either knew, or consciously disregarded information which clearly indicated, that
the subordinates were committing or about to commit such crimes;
(ii) The crimes concerned activities that were
within the effective responsibility and control of the
superior; and
(iii) The superior failed to take all necessary and
reasonable measures within his or her power to prevent or repress their commission or to submit the
matter to the competent authorities for investigation
and prosecution.149
In some respects, the ICC language is more forceful than ICTY or
ICTR’s. Under those two, a commander can be held responsible if he or she
149.

Id. at art. 28.
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“knew or had reason to know” that a subordinate was about to commit certain
crimes.150 With the ICC’s approach, a commander will be held liable if he or
she knew, “or should have known” that such crimes were being (or were
about to be) committed.151 The ICC rendering of command responsibility appears to impose a higher burden on the commander to stay informed of what
his or her troops are up to than does the ICTY or ICTR standard.
Additionally, the ICC statute effectively endorses and makes explicit
what ICTR decided in Musema: civilians are subject to command (or “superior”) responsibility as well. While paragraph (a) of Article 28 refers to military commanders,152 paragraph (b) covers “relationships not described in
paragraph (a),” i.e. superior-subordinate relationships outside the military.153
However, in spite of this seemingly strong language, there are two key
factors that make it harder to convict for command responsibility under the
Rome Statute. The first is that, as already mentioned, countries can effectively take themselves out of the ICC’s jurisdiction by declining to ratify the
treaty. The second is the presence in the Rome Statute of a causality provision. The introductory language to Section 28 states as one of the requirements for a command responsibility conviction not only that a commander
not exercise sufficient control over those under his command, but that any
ensuing crimes must be a consequence of this lack of restraint.154
This causality requirement puts the ICC in stark contrast to ICTY,
which on multiple occasions, including the aforementioned Čelebići trial, explicitly rejected a causation element.155 Similarly, ICTR did not include causality as a requirement in a command responsibility decision.156 The causality
prerequisite adds a significant barrier to command responsibility prosecutions by the ICC.
It is too soon to make definitive judgments on the importance of the
causality requirement condition. For one thing, it is hard to say much about
150. ICTY, supra note 2, at 7(3); ICTR, supra note 3, at 6(3).
151. Rome Statute, supra note 5, art. 28(a)(1).
152. See Rome Statute, supra note 5, art. 28(a).
153. Id. art. 28(b). Though the knowledge standard for civilians is higher than for military commanders: for the latter, it is known or should have known, while for the former it is
known, or consciously disregarded information about atrocities. See id. art. 28(a)(i) and b(i).
154. See id. art. 28(a).
155. See Prosecutor v. Delalić, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber Case No. IT-96-21-T, ¶ 378 (1998); see also, e.g., Prosecutor v. Blaškić,
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Appeals Chamber, Case No. IT95-14-A, ¶ 77 (2004); see also ALEXANDRE SKANDER GALAND, ET AL., INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW GUIDELINES: COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY 83-84 (2nd ed. 2016) (discussing
ICTY’s rejection of a causality requirement).
156. See Garland, supra note 151, at 83, n.305 (referencing the Bagilishema decision,
Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1A-T, Judgment, (June 7, 2001), which discusses the required elements for command responsibility).
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cases that were not brought in the first place. The ICC issued its first command responsibility ruling in 2016, in the case of Jean-Pierre Bemba, a Congolese politician and former rebel leader.157 Because of the newness of the
causality requirement to these types of prosecutions, the ICC was writing on
something of a blank slate. The court ruled that “but for” causality was not
required in order to satisfy Article 28.158 Instead, it set the benchmark as
“crimes would not have been committed, in the circumstances in which they
were, had the commander exercised control properly, or the commander exercising control properly would have prevented the crimes.”159 In applying
this standard to the facts at hand, the court faulted Bemba for not reacting
vigorously enough to initial reports of crimes being committed by forces under his control.160
What could he have done differently? Among other things, the court
suggested Bemba might have provided instruction to his troops about their
obligations under IHL.161 Were anything like this sort of instruction or training requirement imposed on rebel leaders, it would greatly increase the
chances of command responsibility prosecutions under the Rome Statute.
Since rebel forces are generally going to be less organized and less well
trained in comparison to their regular army counterparts, there is a smaller
chance that they will be cognizant of things like their IHL obligations.162
Thus, the court’s suggestion is consistent with the idea that those who make
the laws–in this case states, even a large group of them–feel freer to impose
standards that they are less prone to be at risk of violating. Ultimately, Bemba
was convicted of several violations of the Rome Statute and sentenced to
eighteen years in prison. However, his appeal remains pending, so it is possible that the Appeals Chamber will disagree with the Trial Chamber and
establish different standards for causality.

157. See Prosecutor v. Bemba, ICC-01/05-01/08, Judgment pursuant to Art. 74 of the
Statute, (Mar. 21, 2016). Because the court found that Bemba operated as a military commander at the time the crimes were committed, the case did not provide the court an opportunity to utilize the Rome Statute’s provision on civilian superior responsibility. See id. at ¶
697.
158. Id. at ¶ 211.
159. Id. at ¶ 213.
160. Id. at ¶ 726.
161. See Prosecutor v. Bemba, ICC-01/05-01/08, Judgment pursuant to Art. 74 of the
Statute, ¶ 729 (Mar. 21, 2016).
162. See Geert-Jan Alexander Knoops, The Transposition of Superior Responsibility
onto Guerilla Warfare Under the Laws of the International Criminal Tribunals, 7 INT’L CRIM.
L. REV. 505, 511 (2007) (“[O]ne can say that overall criterion to determine the (ir)regularity
of military forces is the quality and intensity of organizational training . . . .”).
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SIERRA LEONE: THE INFLUENCE OF ICTY
Sierra Leone is a former British colony that achieved independence in
1961. For the next three decades, it was controlled by “an almost uninterrupted succession of despotic leaders who secured their place by military
coup, and the establishment of a one-party system and widespread patronage,
allowing for unrelenting personal enrichment on the part of the ruling
elite.”163 In 1991, the country was invaded from across its border with Liberia
by the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), a group led by Foday Sankoh.164
The decade-long civil war that followed was known especially for two things:
the participation of child soldiers in the fighting165 and the extensive use of
amputations. Nicole Fritz and Alison Smith wrote that “[i]n a decade in
which atrocities had become almost commonplace, Sierra Leone’s conflict
was still shocking. Horror registered at the signature amputations, the thousands of children press-ganged into the service of the respective armed factions, and the fact that they at times seemed the cruelest of combatants.”166
Liberian President Charles Taylor, whose prosecution before the Special
Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) is discussed below, became a chief ally of the
RUF,167 likely at least in part because of the presence in Sierra Leone of diamond mines he wished to have access to.168 Over the next decade, through
multiple failed peace negotiations, the war would continue; by the end of

163. Nicole Fritz and Alison Smith, Current Apathy for Coming Anarchy: Building the
Special Court for Sierra Leone, 25 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 391, 393 (2001); see also Ato
Kwamena Onoma, Transition Regimes and Security Sector Reforms in Sierra Leone and Liberia, 656 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 136, 139 (2014) (describing the country as
being ruled by a “corrupt one-party system” during this period).
164. See Onoma, supra note 163, at 139.
165. Though this conflict is hardly unique in making use of child soldiers. According
to Child Soldiers International, several countries (as well as many non-state actor groups)
continue to make use of child soldiers. See Where Are Child Soldiers?, CHILD SOLDIERS INT’L,
https://www.child-soldiers.org/where-are-there-child-soldiers
[https://perma.cc/38JNQDSG] (last visited Feb. 10, 2018).
166. Fritz and Smith, supra note 163, at 393.
167. Id. at 394.
168. Id. at 399. The indictment that would eventually be filed in SCSL stated that “[t]o
obtain access to the mineral wealth of the Republic of Sierra Leone, in particular the diamond
wealth of Sierra Leone, [Taylor] provided financial support, military training, personnel, arms,
ammunition, and other support and encouragement to the RUF . . . .” Prosecutor v. Taylor,
Case No. SCSL-2003-01-I, Indictment, ¶ 20 (Mar. 3, 2003). This original indictment would
be amended twice. See Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-PT, Prosecutor’s Second Amended Indictment (May 29, 2007) [hereinafter Taylor Amended Indictment].
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large-scale hostilities in 2002, there were estimates as high as 75,000 dead,169
with many more wounded and/or displaced.170
Like ICTY and ICTR, the Special Court for Sierra Leone was established to address human rights abuses in one particular location. However, it
was different than the Yugoslavian and Rwandan tribunals in a number of
important ways: first, it was established at the request of the Sierra Leonean
government itself rather than due to concern from the international community as a whole. In June, 2000 (while the conflict was still ongoing) President
Alhaji Ahmad Tejan Kabbah wrote to the Security Council, requesting the
formation of a special court for the country.171 The President sought the creation of such a court as a means of bringing to justice the leaders of the RUF,
whom President Kabbah held responsible for the long conflict.172
The Council responded two months later with Resolution 1315, which
endorsed the idea of a Sierra Leonean tribunal.173 However, unlike ICTY and
ICTR, what became SCSL was not created as an organ of the Security Council. Instead, the Court was established as a “hybrid” court, with judges coming both from the international community and Sierra Leone itself,174 though
the international judges would be in the majority in both the three-judge trial
chambers and the five-judge appeals chambers.175 While the chief prosecutor
would be from the international community, he would be assigned a deputy
from Sierra Leone.176

169. See Charles C. Jalloh, The Law and Politics of the Charles Taylor Case, 43
DENVER J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 229, 243 (2015). 75,000 people were roughly 1.7% of the country’s total population in 2002. See Sierra Leone Population, WORLDOMETERS.INFO,
http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/sierra-leone-population/
[https://perma.cc/4AN3-3TQS] (last visited Feb. 10, 2018).
170. See Jalloh, supra note 169, at 243. See also Charles C. Jalloh, Assessing the Legacy of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, in THE SIERRA LEONE SPECIAL COURT AND ITS
LEGACY: THE IMPACT FOR AFRICA AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 5 (Charles C. Jalloh,
ed. 2014) (estimating 70,000 dead and 2.6 million displaced).
171. See Charles C. Jalloh, Special Court for Sierra Leone: Achieving Justice?, 32
MICH J. INT’L L. 395, 398 (2011) (internal citation omitted).
172. Id. President Kabbah’s letter stated that the “purpose” of a court for Sierra Leone
would be “to try and bring to credible justice those members of the Revolutionary United
Front (RUF) and their accomplices responsible for committing crimes against the people of
Sierra Leone . . . .” See President of the Republic of Sierra Leone, Annex to the Letter dated
Aug. 9, 2000 from the Permanent Representative of Sierra Leone to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2000/786 (Aug. 10, 2000).
173. See S.C. Res. 1315, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1315 (Aug. 14, 2000). See also Jalloh, supra
note 169, at 399.
174. See Agreement Between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone
on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, art. 2, 2178 U.N.T.S. 137 (Jan. 16,
2002) [hereinafter Special Court Agreement].
175. Id.
176. Id. art. 3.
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Another significant difference from ICTY and ICTR would be location:
while those courts had met outside the countries involved, SCSL was established to meet in Sierra Leone itself. The court would be set up in the capital
city of Freetown. Having a locally-situated court may well have had a positive impact on local reactions to the tribunal’s operations. Public opinion research has shown far more positive attitudes among the Sierra Leonean population toward SCSL than Serbs or Croats feel about ICTY (which is not to
say that the location of the respective courts is the only or even primary causative factor in this difference).177 Serbians, in particular, viewed ICTY as biased against them,178 while many people viewed the court as an Americandominated tribunal merely attempting to prosecute those the United States
saw as enemies.179
Finally, under the terms of Resolution 1315, SCSL’s jurisdiction was
limited in two important respects: first, it would only prosecute “persons who
bear the greatest responsibility for” serious violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law.”180 Thus, mid or low-level offenders,
who may well have committed serious crimes, but whose offenses did not
rise to the status of wholescale attacks on the Sierra Leonean government,
would escape punishment. In a report he issued on SCSL’s formation, then
UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan advocated for the broader term “persons
most responsible,” which, as he pointed out, would have allowed for prosecution in some circumstances of those between the ages of fifteen and eighteen.181 As Arzt notes, this jurisdictional limitation drove a fair amount of the
opposition to the court that opinion research documented, though more on
the part of NGO personnel than on members of the populace at large.182 The
“greatest responsibility” provision might seem like a strange constraint. As I
suggest below in discussing the Malabo Protocol, to the extent that senior
177. See Donna E. Arzt, Views on the Ground: The Local Perception of International
Criminal Tribunals in the Former Yugoslavia and Sierra Leone, 603 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL.
& SOC. SCI. 226, 231-33 (2006). Though note that one commentator asserted that there was a
distinct North/South divide in Sierra Leone when it came to attitudes about the court. See Peter
Penfold, Will Justice Help Peace in Sierra Leone, GUARDIAN (Oct. 19, 2002)
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/oct/20/sierraleone.theworldtodayessays
[https://perma.cc/HA5C-YD2A].
178. See Stuart Ford, Fairness and Politics at the ICTY: Evidence From the Indictments, 39 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 45, 46 (2013) (citing survey results showing that
roughly 80-90% of Serbs saw ICTY as “biased and untrustworthy”) (internal citation omitted).
179. Id. (noting accusations that ICTY was “a scam designed to punish those that the
United States viewed as its enemies”).
180. See S.C. Res. 1315, art. 2.
181. See U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, ¶¶ 29-31, U.N. Doc. S/2000/915 (Oct. 4, 2000)
[hereinafter Secretary-General’s Report].
182. See Arzt, supra note 177, at 233.

2018] STANDARDS IN COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY PROSECUTIONS: HOW STRICT, AND WHY?

329

officials are involved in the writing of rules for tribunals, they will act to
protect themselves.183 Here, the reverse seems to have happened. Why?
The “greatest responsibility” restriction appears initially to have been
part of an attempt to create a court that was, in the words of Judge Antonio
Cassese, “lean and agile as well as inexpensive . . . ,” a response to perceived
flaws with ICTY and ICTR (including allegedly bloated budgets and trials
that dragged on for long periods).184 More specifically, it served as a means
of dealing with two issues. First, it was an attempt to address the question of
how to handle crimes committed by child soldiers. There was a fair amount
of disagreement about whether to prosecute child soldiers. Significant numbers of them indeed committed horrible crimes–the Secretary-General’s report notes that some child soldiers were “feared by many for their brutality .
. . ,”185 but there were serious questions about the voluntariness of their actions, especially given the methods of “recruitment” that had been employed
for them in the first place.186 The “greatest responsibility” language in effect
solved this problem, as no matter how bad the crimes committed by child
soldiers, a reasonable argument could be made that they were not among
those with the “greatest responsibility,” given how they ended up in various
fighting forces as well as the more general issue of what is sensible to expect

183. See infra notes 255-80 and accompanying text.
184. Antonio Cassese (Independent Expert), Report on the Special Court for Sierra
Leone, ¶ 29 (Dec. 12, 2006).
185. Secretary-General’s report, supra note 181, at ¶ 32; see also, e.g., Lucia H. Seyfarth, Child Soldiers to War Criminals: Trauma and the Case for Personal Mitigation, 14 CHI.
KENT J. INT’L & COMP. L. 117, 124 (2013) (“[C]hild soldiers are also perpetrators of some of
the most violent crimes in these conflicts.”); Joshua A. Romero, The Special Court for Sierra
Leone and the Juvenile Soldier Dilemma, 2 NW. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 8, 12 (2004) (“[J]uvenile
soldiers [in Sierra Leone] earned a reputation throughout the region as fearless and bloodthirsty killers.”); Ismene Zarifis, Sierra Leone’s Search for Justice and Accountability of Child
Soldiers, 9 NO. 3 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 18, 19 (2002) (“Under physical and psychological duress,
child combatants committed widespread and systematic atrocities.”).
186. See, e.g., Stephanie H. Bald, Note, Searching for a Lost Childhood: Will the Special Court for Sierra Leone Find Justice for its Children?, 18 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 537, 549
(2002) (“[A]s evidenced by the abuses committed in Sierra Leone, forced recruitment often
becomes systematic due to the lack of serious legal ramifications armed groups face.”). The
author further observes that “desperation, rather than military zeal, most often pushes children
to become soldiers.” Id. at 550.
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from teenagers. Even though SCSL’s staute would have allowed for prosecutions of those over the age of fifteen,187 the prosecutor declined to bring
cases against anyone under eighteen.188
Second, the “greatest responsibility” limitation acted as a way to manage the somewhat precarious funding mechanism established for SCSL. Unlike ICTY and ICTR, SCSL was funded by voluntary donations from member states,189 despite strong objections to this method from the SecretaryGeneral, who called for funding through assessed contributions.190 Not surprisingly, relying on optional contributions led to a budget that Professor
Jalloh has described as “shoestring,”191 and which was a fraction of ICTY
and ICTR’s.192 Jalloh further suggests that budgetary concerns led the Prosecutor to interpret the “greatest responsibility” language too narrowly.193
The other main restriction on the court’s jurisdiction was temporal.
SCSL was only given jurisdiction over crimes committed after November 30,
1996,194 the date of the signing of the first (failed) peace accord between the
government and the RUF,195 even though the conflict had started five and a
half years earlier.196 The temporal restriction may well have been at least in
part an attempt to cope with the court’s limited resources. The SecretaryGeneral’s report on the formation of SCSL expressed his concern that “the
prosecutor should not be overburdened nor the Court overloaded.”197
187. See SCSL Statute, supra note 4, at art. 7(1). Even though the statute would have
allowed prosecuting children of this age, it was clear that if such prosecutions occurred at all,
the defendants were to be treated differently than adults: “Should any person who was at the
time of the alleged commission of the crime between 15 and 18 years of age come before the
Court, he or she shall be treated with dignity and a sense of worth, taking into account his or
her young age and the desirability of promoting his or her rehabilitation, reintegration into and
assumption of a constructive role in society, and in accordance with international human rights
standards, in particular the rights of the child.” Id.
188. See David M. Rosen, Who is a Child? The Legal Conundrum of Child Soldiers,
25 CONN. J. INT’L L. 81, 84 (2010).
189. See Special Court Agreement, supra note 174, at art. 6.
190. See Secretary-General’s Report, supra note 181, para. 71; see also Jalloh, supra
note 169, at 402; Fritz & Smith, supra note 163, at 418.
191. Jalloh, supra note 169, at 413; see also Cassese, supra note 179, para. 249 (“The
current practice of an international Court begging for money from donor countries, exhausting
its resources, and coming back again for another handout should be stopped. This practice
undermines the authority of the Court, decreases efficiency, and wastes resources.”).
192. See Fritz & Smith, supra note 163, at 420 (noting the differences between ICTY’s
($108 million) and ICTR’s ($93 million) 2001 budgets and the $15 million raised for SCSL).
193. Id. at 421-22.
194. See S.C. Res. 1315, art. 1(1) (Aug. 14, 2000).
195. See Secretary-General’s Report, supra note 181, 27; see also Fritz & Smith, supra
note 163, at 410.
196. See Jalloh, supra note 169, at 403.
197. Secretary-General’s Report, supra note 181, para. 25; see also Fritz & Smith,
supra note 163, at 411. Fritz and Smith point out that this choice of date caused a bit of a
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These differences aside, the formation of SCSL had at least one important quality in common with the creations of ICTY and ICTR: it was accomplished fairly quickly, even though the tribunal’s establishment was negotiated with representatives of the affected country. The agreement for the
formation of SCSL and the accompanying statute for the court were finalized
in January, 2002, roughly eighteen months after President Kabbah’s initial
request to the Security Council.198 The SCSL’s command responsibility language is essentially the same as ICTY’s and ICTR’s:
The fact that any of the acts referred to in articles 2
to 4 of the present Statute was committed by a subordinate does not relieve his or her superior of criminal responsibility if he or she knew or had reason
to know that the subordinate was about to commit
such acts or had done so and the superior had failed
to take the necessary and reasonable measures to
prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators
thereof.199
Notably, the command responsibility provision did not apply to Article
5 of the SCSL statute, which listed several crimes specifically as violations
of Sierra Leonean law.200 The SCSL statute contained a few other provisions
specific to the situation as it had unfolded there. In particular, it had explicit
language calling for the prosecution of individuals who had recruited or used
child soldiers (defined as those under the age of fifteen).201 The statute also
did not assert jurisdiction over individuals under the age of fifteen at the time
of crimes they were alleged to have committed, thereby immunizing this
group of juvenile combatants.202
The SCSL heard four significant command responsibility cases. The
most notable of these (not necessarily because of the legal doctrine, but because of the defendant’s crimes and reputation) was the prosecution of Libe-

divide in perceptions of the court between those closer to the capital city of Freetown, which
did not suffer from much violence during the time excluded by the agreement, and the country’s outer provinces, in which the fighting had started much earlier. See id. at 411-12; see
also Jalloh, supra note 169, at 454 (“Furthermore, the limited temporal jurisdiction of the
SCSL (covering only the latter half of the war) meant that certain prosecutions could only take
place with respect to certain crime bases in major centers like the capital, Freetown. This was
to the detriment of earlier incidents in the rural parts of Sierra Leone.”).
198. See Special Court Agreement, supra note 174.
199. SCSL Statute, supra note 4, at art. 6(3).
200. Id. at art. 5.
201. Id. art. 4(c).
202. Id. art. 7(1).
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ria’s Charles Taylor. Taylor was charged on eleven separate counts, including acts of terrorism, murder, sexual violence, cutting off limbs, conscription
of child soldiers, enslavement, and looting.203(Foot note?) As the indictment
stated, these were crimes that violated Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and also constituted Crimes Against Humanity as well as violations
of IHL.204 Controversially, despite the emphasis on having a locally based
tribunal, the decision was made to hold Taylor’s trial in The Hague.205 This
was said to be for security reasons, though many were not satisfied with this
explanation.206 This different treatment of Taylor did not end with the trial
location: while everyone else convicted by SCSL was imprisoned in Africa,
Taylor is serving his sentence in Britain.207
Taylor’s indictment notes that he was being accused of liability under
both Articles 6(1) and 6(3) of the SCSL statute.208 The former assigns responsibility to anyone who “planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime”
covered by the statute,209 while the latter is the command responsibility provision quoted above. As Professor Jalloh points out, Taylor “reportedly never
set foot in Sierra Leone during the time the offenses for which he was charged
were perpetrated,”210 meaning that he had to be charged with ordering the
commission of the listed crimes and/or failing to take steps to prevent his
subordinates from carrying them out. The case was also complicated by the
fact that Taylor had been President of Liberia for roughly six years, starting
in August, 1997,211 meaning that he was head of state during most of the time
covered by the charges.212
Though Taylor was eventually convicted of all of the charges against
him, the SCSL trial chamber ruled that he was only liable under certain portions of Article 6(1). The court found that Taylor was not guilty of participating in a joint criminal enterprise,213 but was guilty of aiding and abetting
the commission of the offenses charged in the indictment, as well as planning
the execution of these crimes.214 The court also ruled that he could not be
203. Taylor Amended Indictment, supra note 168, at 5-32.
204. Id. at 3-8.
205. See Jalloh, supra note 169, at 235.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Taylor Amended Indictment, supra note 168, at paras. 33-34.
209. SCSL Statute, supra note 4, at art. 6(1).
210. Jalloh, supra note 169, at 232.
211. See Taylor Amended Indictment, supra note 168, at para. 3.
212. Though all of the charges included at least some time before he became President.
See id. passim.
213. See Judgement para. 6900, Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T (May
18, 2012) [hereinafter Taylor Trial Judgment].
214. Id. at para. 6994.
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convicted of instigating215 the charged crimes or ordering their commission,216 the latter because while he was found to have a position of authority
within the RUF, his views on their activities were of an advisory nature, and
were not automatically carried out.217
In light of this portion of the ruling, it is perhaps not surprising that the
court declined to hold Taylor liable under the command responsibility provision.218 To the trial chamber, the key issue was whether it could be demonstrated that Taylor had “effective control” over the troops that had committed
the acts in question.219 With regard to individual rebel leaders, the court held
that while Taylor was clearly a person of influence, this influence was not
sufficiently great so as to turn these leaders into his subordinates.220 And as
to rebel forces, the court found that it could not be established that Taylor
retained effective control over them once they crossed the border from Liberia into Sierra Leone.221 In relying on the effective control standard, the SCSL
trial chamber was following in the footsteps of the aforementioned ICTY
rulings.222 Taylor was sentenced to fifty years in prison,223 a punishment
which was upheld on appeal.224 The prosecution does not appear to have challenged the use of the effective control standard; the appeals chamber references it merely in passing.225 The Delalić and Kordić and Čerkez rulings,
discussed above, are included in the Table of Authorities appendix to the appellate chamber’s opinion.226
Though Taylor was acquitted of command responsibility liability, there
were three successful prosecutions under Article 6(3): Prosecutor v. Fofana
et al.,227 Prosecutor v. Sesay et al.,228 and Prosecutor v. Brima et al.229 In the
first of these, the two defendants were leaders of the Civil Defense Forces

215. Id. at para. 6972.
216. Id. at para. 6973.
217. Id.
218. See Judgement para. 6986, Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T (May
18, 2012).
219. Id. at para. 6978.
220. Id. at paras. 6980-83.
221. Id. at para. 6984.
222. See supra notes 108-111 and accompanying text.
223. See Sentencing Judgement at 40, Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T
(May 30, 2012).
224. See Appeal Judgement, Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-A, at 305
(Sept. 26, 2013).
225. See, e.g., id. at para. 1999.
226. See id. at 324-25.
227. Prosecutor v. Fofana et al., Case No. SCSL-04-14-T (Sierra Leone Aug. 2, 2007).
228. Prosecutor v. Sesay et al., Case No. SCSL-04-15-T (Sierra Leone Mar. 2, 2009).
229. Prosecutor v. Brima et al., Case No. SCSL-04-16-T (Sierra Leone June 20, 2007).

334

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38-2

(CDF), a group that had fought in support of President Kabbah’s government,230 which at one point had been deposed by a rebel group, the Armed
Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC).231 But the other two cases, like the
Taylor prosecution, were brought against those associated with rebel groups.
Moinina Fofana and his co-defendant, Allieu Kondewa, were charged
with crimes against humanity, war crimes, and violations of IHL.232 As is
common in these cases, the prosecution advanced theories of liability tied to
both Articles 6(1) and 6(3) of the court’s statute.233 The court, however, again
relying on ICTY precedents, explained that it would not hold the defendants
liable under 6(3) where liability was already shown under 6(1).234 Turning to
ICTY case law, the court laid out three criteria for a finding of command
responsibility: existence of superior-subordinate relationship; the superior
knew or had reason to know that a criminal act was about to take place or
already had; and the superior failed to take necessary and reasonable
measures to prevent the act or punish the perpetrators after.235 The court further explained that a superior could be said to have control either de facto or
de jure, and again endorsed the ICTY “effective control” standard for determining if such a relationship existed.236 The tribunal emphasized that command responsibility is not a strict liability offense.237 In the end, the court
relied on both articles of the statute to find the defendants guilty, so the availability of a command responsibility analysis was by no means superfluous.
The trial chamber turned to Article 6(3) to find each defendant guilty of some
of the charges in the indictment.238 One twist on the jurisprudence of the trial,
Kondewa’s status as a witch doctor, and the effect this had on CDF soldiers,
is discussed below.239
Issa Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon, and Augustine Gbao were senior
members of the RUF.240 Sesay, who himself had been forcibly recruited into
the RUF as a teenager, 241 rose at one point as high as acting leader of the
230. See Fofana, supra note 227, at ¶¶ 1-2. The case originally had three defendants,
the most notable of whom was Samuel Hinga Norman, a senior official in the Sierra Leonean
government and head of the CDF. Id. at ¶ 1. Hinga Norman died after the trial was completed,
but before judgment could be rendered, id. at ¶ 4, and thus is largely, though not completely,
omitted from the opinion.
231. Id. at ¶ 11.
232. Id. at ¶ 108.
233. Prosecutor v. Fofana et al., Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, ¶¶ 204, 232 (Sierra Leone
Aug. 2, 2007).
234. See Fofana, supra note 227, at ¶ 251.
235. Id. at ¶ 235.
236. Id. at ¶¶ 236-38.
237. Id. at ¶ 242.
238. Id. at ¶¶ 846, 903.
239. See infra notes 261-67 and accompanying text.
240. See Sesay, supra note 228, at ¶ 4.
241. See Seyfarth, supra note 185, at 119.
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group,242 while both Kallon243 and Gbao244 were described as “senior officer[s] and commander[s]” of the RUF. The three were indicted on multiple
counts of crimes against humanity, war crimes, and violations of IHL245 under both Article 6(1) and 6(3) theories of responsibility.246 The Sesay trial
chamber stuck to the same standards for command responsibility as had the
Fofana court.247 And as with the Fofana trial, the court issued a split verdict:
not guilty of some charges, guilty of others under Article 6(1), and guilty of
still others under Article 6(3).248
The trial of Alex Tamba Brima, Ibrahim Bazzy Kamara, and Santigie
Borbor Kanu249 unfolded in somewhat similar fashion. The three were members of the pro-rebel group AFRC. The amended consolidated indictment of
the three describes each of them as “senior member[s] of the AFRC,” alleged
that they participated in the coup against President Kabbah, and further alleged that they had commanded forces that had, among other things, carried
out attacks on civilians.250 As with the Sesay and Fofana rulings, the court
found the defendants guilty of some charges, mostly under Article 6(1), but
with each defendant, the trial chamber also used Article 6(3) to convict.251
In one sense, the most significant part of SCSL’s work was that it convicted Charles Taylor, who had been a sitting head of state while committing
many of the crimes for which he was prosecuted. The decision to indict him
was extremely controversial.252 But he was out of office by the time of his
conviction, so at least the court was not attempting to imprison a currently in
power ruler.
As noted above, in making its rulings, SCSL relied heavily on the work
of ICTY,253 so it should not be surprising that its decisions followed already
242. See Sesay, supra note 228, at ¶ 42.
243. Sesay Amended Indictment at ¶ 24, Prosecutor v. Sesay et al., Case No. SCSL04-15-PT (Sierra Leone Aug. 2, 2006).
244. Id. at ¶ 29.
245. See Sesay, supra note 228, at ¶ 6. Two other, more senior members of the RUF,
Foday Sankoh and Sam Bockarie, were also indicted by SCSL, but died before they could be
brought to trial. See id. at ¶ 5.
246. See Sesay Amended Indictment, supra note 243, at ¶¶ 38-39.
247. See Sesay, supra note 228, at ¶¶ 285-89.
248. Id. at ¶¶ 677-87.
249. See Prosecutor v. Brima et al., Case No. SCSL-04-16-T (Sierra Leone June 20,
2007).
250. See Brima Amended Indictment at ¶¶ 22-30, Prosecutor v. Brima et al., Case No.
SCSL-04-16-PT (Sierra Leone May 13, 2004).
251. See Brima, supra note 249, at ¶¶ 2113-23.
252. See Jalloh, supra note 169, at 250-52.
253. See Secretary-General’s Report, supra note 181, at ¶¶ 64-65. The Secretary-General’s report on the formation of SCSL explicitly calls for the new court to receive assistance
from ICTY and ICTR personnel, so some level of influence from the prior courts was inevitable.

336

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38-2

established case law, even if SCSL was in no formal sense bound by ICTY
precedent. The court’s main jurisprudential contribution seems to have been
the application of established principles to different, and somewhat difficult,
factual situations. In particular, when it comes to command responsibility,
SCSL was faced with applying previously established benchmarks, most notably the “effective control” rule, to situations involving irregular forces,
whose command structures to some degree lacked the formality of more regularly constituted armies. In his chapter in the edited collection The Sierra
Leone Special Court and its Legacy: The Impact for Africa and International
Criminal Law, Harmen van der Wilt explores how the SCSL trial chambers
discussed above handled this question.254 An accompanying chapter examines how the court dealt with claims of command responsibility based upon
Kondewa’s status as a witch doctor.255
Van der Wilt describes the problem as how to handle defendants “wielding power over armies and military groups displaying rather distinct levels
of organization.”256 In its Brima ruling, the trial chamber wrote that “[i]n a
conflict characterised by the participation of irregular armies or rebel groups,
the traditional indicia of effective control . . . may not be appropriate or useful.”257 If the “traditional indicia” would not work, what factors might the
court consider? Whether the superior “had first entitlement to the profits of
war,” or “exercised control over the fate of vulnerable persons,” or “had independent access to and/or control of the means to wage war,” among other
things.258 Van der Wilt charges that the choice of these criteria was “strongly
engrafted upon the evidence available to the Chamber,”259 suggesting resultsoriented jurisprudence aimed at achieving and justifying convictions. But just
as the court seemed about to engage in creating a significantly different
standard for irregular armies, it caught itself and moved quickly back toward
criteria used to assess command responsibility in more conventional military
situations: “the key traditional indicia of effective control remain central,”
especially the alleged superior’s ability to issue orders and to take disciplinary action.260
254. See Harmen van der Wilt, Command Responsibility in the Jungle: Some Reflections on the Elements of Effective Command and Control, in THE SIERRA LEONE SPECIAL
COURT AND ITS LEGACY: THE IMPACT FOR AFRICA AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 144-58
(Charles C. Jalloh, ed. 2014).
255. See René Provost, Authority, Responsibility, and Witchcraft: From Tintin to the
SCSL, in THE SIERRA LEONE SPECIAL COURT AND ITS LEGACY: THE IMPACT FOR AFRICA AND
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 159-80 (Charles C. Jalloh, ed. 2014).
256. Van der Wilt, supra note 254, at 148.
257. Brima, supra note 249, at ¶ 787; see van der Wilt, supra note 254, at 149.
258. Brima, supra note 249, at ¶ 788; see Van der Wilt, supra note 254, at 149.
259. Van der Wilt, supra note 254, at 149.
260. See Brima, supra note 249, at ¶ 789; see also Van der Wilt, supra note 254, at
149.
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Why did the court step back from a bolder stance? Perhaps because,
ultimately, it did not need to go that far to impose liability. As van der Wilt
notes, the court ruled that the AFRC “had a functioning chain of command”
sufficient to decide that Brima had “effective control” for a command responsibility conviction.261
The question of whether Allieu Kondewa could be held liable under a
command responsibility theory on the basis of his perceived authority as a
witch doctor of course presented an even more novel question of law. As
René Provost writes,
Kondewa did not hold a political or military role of
the type that normally attracts responsibility for the
act of another. Kondewa was instead the witch doctor for the CDF, officiating initiation ceremonies for
new fighters in the Kamajors secret society and administering lotions and potions to make fighters invisible and invincible to bullets.262
But Kondewa’s authority was not solely a question of his alleged mystical powers. Provost states that “no important decision was reached without
the agreement of” Kondewa and his (initially) two co-defendants, Moinina
Fofana and Sam Hinga Norman.263 Furthermore, none of the Kamajor soldiers of the CDF “would dare participate in a battle without the blessing of
their High Priest.”264 Thus, there was good reason to view Kondewa as an
individual in a position to exercise “effective control” over subordinates,
even if in a rather non-traditional manner.
Once again, however, the trial chamber took a somewhat conservative
line on this issue. The court ruled that in general, whatever authority Kondewa derived from the Kamajors’ belief in his mystical powers, this clout did
not extend to an ability to prevent violations of international law or to punish
such violations.265 For the one instance in which the court did find Kondewa
liable under Article 6(3), it was because of the particular factual situation:
one local commander who considered himself subordinate to Kondewa,
which gave Kondewa the requisite authority to be said to have “effective
control.”266 This exception aside, “[m]ere ‘psychological’ or spiritual power
261.
150.
262.
263.
264.
265.
n.33.
266.
168-69.

See Brima, supra note 249, at ¶ 1723; see also Van der Wilt, supra note 254, at
Provost, supra note 255, at 164.
Id. at 166.
Id.
See Fofana, supra note 227, at ¶ 853; see also Provost, supra note 255, at 168,
See Fofana, supra note 227, at ¶¶ 868-872; see also Provost, supra note 255, at
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over people will not suffice to sustain a finding of criminal liability. . . . Kondewa only incurred criminal responsibility as a superior when his mystical
powers over the Kamajors solidified in a more concrete capacity to issue orders by virtue of his being integrated in the chain of command.”267 Interestingly, this ruling on Kondewa’s ability to “command” on the basis of psychological/spiritual influence leads van der Wilt to suggest that ICTR’s ruling in Musema lowered the bar for command responsibility too much.268
Thus, in at least two instances where the Sierra Leone court could have
broken new ground, the tribunal took a more cautious path. This would seem
to be at least in part due to the influence of ICTY’s rulings. While in Tadić,
ICTY looked as though it might strike out on its own in some areas of international human rights jurisprudence, when it came to command responsibility decisions, the court instead acted somewhat conservatively, not applying
new or looser standards. Apart from ICTY’s influence, it may also be the
case that being a hybrid court—formed through negotiations between Sierra
Leone and the UN, and including judges from Sierra Leone and the rest of
the world—moderated SCSL’s rulings.
Probably the strongest evidence for the influence of the impact of the
rule-makers on the court’s jurisprudence was that international peacekeepers
sent to the area were largely exempt from SCSL’s jurisdiction for any violations of international law they committed; the accountability for their conduct
being primarily the responsibility of their home states.269 It was only if the
home state was unwilling or unable to prosecute that SCSL could assert jurisdiction and even then only with the Security Council’s permission.270
Thus, it was unlikely that peacekeepers were ever at serious risk of prosecution, if for no other reason than attempting to do so might make countries
unwilling to contribute forces to future operations.271
This was not an issue of mere theoretical importance. As David Scheffer
points out, UN forces were alleged to have, among other things, engaged in
summary executions of rebels.272 Their immunity from SCSL jurisdiction
damaged the perception of the court’s legitimacy among Sierra Leoneans,273
267. Van der Wilt, supra note 254, at 156.
268. Id.
269. See SCSL Statute, supra note 4, at art. 1(2) (stating that crimes by peacekeepers
“shall be within the primary jurisdiction of the sending State.”).
270. Id. at art. 1(3).
271. See, e.g., Celina Schocken, Note, The Special Court for Sierra Leone: Overview
and Recommendations, 20 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 436, 446 (2002).
272. See David J. Scheffer, War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, 11 PACE INT’L
L. REV. 319, 323 (1999).
273. See Vincent O. Nmehielle & Charles C. Jalloh, The Legacy of the Special Court
for Sierra Leone, 30 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 107, 121 (2006). Similarly, at least part of the
reason for negative views of ICTY was that court’s decision not to consider whether interna-
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though the question of how to address wrongdoing by UN peacekeepers is
certainly not limited to Sierra Leone.274 SCSL was the first of the tribunals
considered here to be established with the participation of the home country,
so perhaps there was more reason to think that accountability for the UN
would be part of the discussion. But it did not come to pass. As will be discussed further below when looking at the Malabo Protocol, one way of avoiding the issue of command responsibility is simply to make yourself immune
from prosecution.
A WORD ABOUT THE MALABO PROTOCOL
In 2014, the African Union added an additional protocol (which became
known as the Malabo Protocol) to the Charter of the Union’s Statute of the
African Court of Justice and Human Rights. This Charter was established by
African countries themselves to govern their own conduct going forward.
According to the theory proposed here, this method of creation of the Charter
and Protocol would suggest a particularly high-level requirement for command responsibility. Not only, as with the ICC, was this something created
by the countries which it would govern, but it was created by a relatively
small subset of them, thereby reinforcing the immediacy of the threat of prosecution.
The results strongly suggested that the risk of liability weighed heavily
on the Malabo Protocol’s authors. Article 46(B) contains fairly standard rules
on command responsibility, using language which is similar to the ICTY and
ICTR statutes:
The fact that any of the acts referred to in article
28A of the present Statute was committed by a subordinate does not relieve his or her superior of criminal responsibility if he or she knew or had reason
to know that the subordinate was about to commit
such acts or had done so and the superior failed to

tional law may have been violated by NATO intervenors during the alliance’s bombing campaign. See, e.g., Michael Mandel, Politics and Human Rights in International Criminal Law:
Our Case Against NATO and the Lessons to be Learned From It, 25 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 95,
96 (2001) (criticizing ICTY and chief prosecutor Carla Del Ponte for refusing to investigate
allegations against NATO forces); Robert M. Hayden, Biased “Justice”: Humanrightsism and
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 47 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 549, 551
(1999) (criticizing ICTY for “the failure to prosecute NATO personnel for acts that are comparable to those of Yugoslavs already indicted, and of failure to prosecute NATO personnel
for prima facie war crimes.”).
274. See infra notes 292-301 and accompanying text.
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take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators
thereof.275
Unlike with the ICC, there is no explicit causality requirement, which
might make the Protocol appear relatively friendlier to accountability. However, Article 46(B) is preceded by Article 46(A), which states as follows:
No charges shall be commenced or continued before the Court against any serving AU Head of State
or Government, or anybody acting or entitled to act
in such capacity, or other senior state officials based
on their functions, during their tenure of office.276
This is a rather momentous loophole. The idea that a head of state is (or
should be) immune from liability is hardly a new concept in international
affairs. Still, this provision goes against a tide that has moved toward the
conclusion that eliminating impunity requires that no one be above the law.
In the midst of peace negotiations in Sierra Leone, then UN Secretary-General Annan stated that the organization would not support amnesties for war
crimes.277 Citing the Secretary-General’s report, Jane Stromseth notes that
this is part of a relatively recent movement away from such amnesties.278
Similarly, Mark Ellis comments that “[i]nternational practice has begun to
exhibit a trend in favor of prosecution and away from granting amnesties for
human rights violations.”279
Thus, the immunity provision would seem to be a step back from this
trend. The language may reflect anger in African countries over the controversial decision by the ICC to indict Sudanese President al-Bashir. But even
275. Malabo Protocol, supra note 6, art 46(B).
276. Id. art. 46(A).
277. See U.N. Secretary-General, Seventh Report of the Secretary-General on the
United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. S/1999/836 (July 30, 1999)
(“I instructed my Special Representative to sign the [Lomé Peace Agreement] with the explicit
proviso that the United Nations holds the understanding that the amnesty and pardon in article
IX of the agreement shall not apply to international crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and other serious violations of international humanitarian law.”).
278. See JANE E. STROMSETH, Peacebuilding and Transitional Justice: The Road
Ahead, in MANAGING CONFLICT IN A WORLD ADRIFT 579 (Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler
Hampson & Pamela Aall eds. 2015); see also Jalloh, supra note 169, at 245-46 (discussing
actions of Secretary-General’s representative during Lomé negotiations).
279. Mark S. Ellis, Combating Impunity and Enforcing Accountability as a Way to
Promote Peace and Stability – The Role of International War Crimes Tribunals, 2 J. NAT’L
SECURITY L. & POL’Y 111, 116 (2006); see also JANE STROMSETH, DAVID WIPPMAN & ROSA
BROOKS, CAN MIGHT MAKE RIGHTS? BUILDING THE RULE OF LAW AFTER MILITARY
INTERVENTIONS 252 (2006) (“[T]he normative acceptability of amnesties for serious offenses
is more contested today, both internationally and domestically.”).
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beyond immunity for heads of state, it extends this protection to “other senior
state officials.” A somewhat sui generis exemption for one individual (or one
office) has now been extended to a poorly defined (but potentially large)
group of people.280
This does not, of course, wholly eliminate the possibility of command
responsibility prosecutions. But, it does eliminate it for precisely the types of
individuals who presumably heavily influenced the writing of the Protocol in
the first place. The lower-level commanders who remain liable under the Protocol’s command responsibility provision probably did not have a similar
level of control over its creation. To put it another way, Professor Jalloh, in
discussing the Charles Taylor prosecution, states that the case “affirms that
when there is political will, no immunity will attach to a current or former
president when he is tried before an international court for international
crimes.”281 In the writing of the Malabo Protocol, perhaps political will was
lacking when it came to the possibility of being subject to one’s own rules.
The Protocol has yet to be ratified by enough countries to come into force,
so it is too soon to tell how it will be interpreted by the African court, or how
broadly immunity for “other senior state officials” will be extended. But its
immunity provision fits within what I have suggested we should expect.
CONCLUSION
I began by proposing that the differing standards employed for various
iterations of command responsibility prosecutions could be tied to one variable in particular: how concerned were those creating a given standard with
it potentially being used against themselves? If the answer was “not at all,”
or “not very,” then a pro-prosecution rule was likely to be deployed. The
greater the risk of the standard being applied more broadly, especially on
those who created it, the higher the requirements that would be needed to
prosecute command responsibility cases.
I believe the evidence supports this contention. The most obvious example of this, of course, is the Yamashita trial. The American military—or,
rather, General MacArthur—developed rules out of whole cloth simply for
the purpose of going after a senior Japanese military figure, one who had
been a rival to MacArthur himself on the battlefield. As the facts described
above demonstrate, the low benchmark for command responsibility was part
of a scenario in which there was no real chance that General Yamashita was
280. It is possible to read the placement of a comma after the word “functions” as
indicating that immunity will only exist while an individual is in office. But even that would
be a significant restriction, especially in countries where free and fair elections are not guaranteed, reducing the changeover of high government officials.
281. See Jalloh, supra note 169, at 276.
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going to be acquitted, due process/fair trial concerns be damned.282 Furthermore, as the examples from the Korean and Vietnam wars demonstrate, the
US was entirely unwilling to apply anything like the standards it used against
General Yamashita to the conduct of its own soldiers, emphasizing that the
Yamashita rules were a one-time, prosecution friendly setup. Similarly, while
the rules applied by American-run tribunals in the two Nuremberg cases were
not as punitive as those used against Yamashita, they were also not rules that
the US was willing to apply against its own forces. Indeed, the US was either
unwilling to admit the existence of crimes in the first place (as in the Korean
example) or unwilling to admit that the crimes its personnel committed constituted violations of international law (as in My Lai).
A somewhat different example, but with an analogous outcome, comes
to us from the Malabo Protocol. In this case, it was not the definition of command responsibility that was the issue. Rather, it was the explicit refusal by
those writing the statute to apply it to themselves. Creating a high bar for
command responsibility prosecutions is one way to lower the risk of prosecution; explicitly declaring yourself immune from the charge is even more
effective.
The ICTY, ICTR, and ICC examples are less stark but also provide evidence supporting the general proposition. Since ICTY and ICTR were both
set up as single-use tribunals, we might have expected them to be especially
harsh in their treatment of command responsibility defendants. This expectation was not entirely borne out. Especially notable was ICTY’s decision to
retain the “effective control” standard for command responsibility prosecutions, even as it contradicted the ICJ and employed the lower “overall control” standard for state responsibility. In the case of ICTR, the issue was less
the standard for command responsibility than its decision to employ it against
a civilian, a decision which could have brought far more people under its
control. Still, neither of these tribunals came close to the excesses of the
Yamashita trial and the Malabo Protocol immunity provision, either in their
treatment of defendants or in creating an escape clause for senior leaders.
It is useful, then, to compare ICTY and ICTR to the ICC. The ICC, of
course, has the broadest mandate of any of the tribunals discussed here, and
the largest number of participants who might be subject to its jurisdiction,
including many of those who wrote the Rome Statute in the first place. As
might have been predicted, unlike ICTY and ICTR, the Rome Statute included a causality requirement for command responsibility prosecutions,
thereby raising the standard for cases tried under its provisions. Thus, the
tribunal where those who created it had more reason to fear being subject to
its rules did indeed produce a higher bar to winning command responsibility
282. Again, none of this is to suggest that General Yamashita definitively had clean
hands, or had not been guilty of acts for which he could have been prosecuted, simply that his
trial fell far short of basic notions of fairness.
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cases. The fact that it took more than a decade after the ICC’s creation for
there to even be a command responsibility trial is telling, even if it is too soon
to know what this truly indicates for the possibility of command responsibility prosecutions in the ICC over the long term.
SCSL raised somewhat different issues than the other tribunals. On the
one hand, as noted above, it was heavily influenced by ICTY’s jurisprudence.
In that sense, its case law did not, by and large, create new jurisprudential
developments (except for addressing how to handle cases involving those
with alleged supernatural powers). But, it did help to demonstrate at least one
respect in which the law is developing, namely the general trend against immunity for serious violations of international law, even for heads of state.
However, it also showed a way in which the law has not changed: the immunity that the UN enforces for its own peacekeepers. As with the Malabo
Protocol, immunity is an effective way of structuring the rules so as to avoid
one’s own accountability. This helps to give a more complete picture: in sum,
taking all of these factors and tribunals into account, the evidence for the
trend I suggested at the beginning is quite real.
Still, this does not mean that pure self-interest is all that is driving these
decisions. Since command responsibility jurisprudence is fairly new and
there is not yet a large body of case law on it, some of the different outcomes
described here may simply reflect the fits and starts of an inchoate doctrine
developing. As discussed above, SCSL was heavily influenced by ICTY.
Adria De Landri suggests that on the whole ICTY’s rulings have been especially influential in the development of command responsibility law, not only
in tribunals with identical command responsibility provisions (including
ICTR and Sierra Leone, as well as Cambodia’s tribunal), but even in the ICC,
whose statute has somewhat different language.283 ICTY was the first of these
courts to come into being, has had a relatively large caseload, and many of
its personnel have gone on to work in other tribunals,284 so it should not surprise us that its rulings have been influential. With regard to the ICC, whose
command responsibility language is different, De Landri asserts that the
court has ignored the dictates of its own statute in favor of relying on principles developed by ICTY,285 a development she favors.286
So where do we go from here? In his speech at the 2017 Samuel Dash
Conference on Human Rights, Gambian Chief Justice Hassan Bubacar Jallow made two comments particularly relevant to this analysis.287 The Chief

283. See Adria De Landri, Command Responsibility in the Tribunals: Is There a Hierarchy?, 49 CRIM. L. BULL. 1, 1 (2013).
284. Id. at 9.
285. Id. at 9-10.
286. Id. at 10-11.
287. GEORGETOWN LAW, 2017 Samuel Dash Conference on Human Rights (Apr. 3,
2017 9:00 AM), http://apps.law.georgetown.edu/webcasts/eventDetail.cfm?eventID=3119.
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Justice was asked to predict the future of human rights prosecutions. He responded, inter alia, that he believed that the immunity provision in the Malabo Protocol would likely be struck down as inconsistent with the African
Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights. He also stated that he believed that
the days of wholly international, single event tribunals like ICTY and ICTR
are behind us. Instead, the future will see more use of hybrid international/domestic tribunals. If he is correct, SCSL, or something close to it, would appear to be the wave of the future, as opposed to a repeat of ICTY or ICTR.
As to the first of these predictions, it would of course be a game changer
for the Malabo Protocol if heads of state and senior officials end up subject
to command responsibility prosecutions. If this happens, it will be interesting
to see whether there is some sort of counter reaction, or an additional attempt
to amend the Charter. As to the second, greater use of hybrid tribunals would
potentially mean that rules would be influenced—as SCSL’s were—both by
the side generally more likely to be pro-prosecution (international), as well
as by local interests wary of being prosecuted themselves. Perhaps this will
create some sort of (uneasy?) balance, or perhaps some standard, be it the
ICC’s, ICTY’s or otherwise, will eventually come to be accepted as the norm
for these types of cases. Of course, there is also the chance that a government
participating in establishing a tribunal to prosecute crimes committed in a
war that it was involved in – but presumably emerged victorious from – will
be motivated to be especially harsh in the hopes that the tribunal will come
down hardest on its past opponents. But, it may not be possible to guarantee
that tribunals operate in this manner. As discussed above, in the case of Sierra
Leone, the court ended up prosecuting at least some cases against defendants
who had fought for the government. Ironically, it was the international side
that used its influence in setting up the rules to avoid prosecution, though
again, that only applied to its own personnel and not to the participants on
either side of Sierra Leone’s civil war.
Regardless of which side is tinkering with the rules, we should be concerned by attempts to create overly severe rules for one situation or defendant
that are not then applied consistently, or, conversely, attempts to simply exempt one side or participant from the rules altogether. In his “Letter From
Birmingham City Jail,” Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. decried laws that people
in power impose on others without applying to themselves, calling such statutes “difference made legal.”288 Those forming international tribunals should
keep the principles he espoused in mind. Justice for individuals and groups
affected by wars does not consist solely in seeing wrongdoers punished, but
also in demonstrating to affected populations that fairness has prevailed. As
Arzt’s article discussed,289 ICTY’s work was not well received by either of
288. See MARTIN LUTHER KING JR., A TESTAMENT OF HOPE: THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS
AND SPEECHES OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 294 (James M. Washington ed., 1986).
289.

See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
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the directly affected sides—though it is certainly possible that nothing could
have overcome the extreme polarization that existed. SCSL’s record in this
regard is stronger, though here, too, there were some regional divides in feelings about the court.290 Even if scrupulous attempts at holding everyone accountable to the same set of rules do not guarantee that a court’s work will
be accepted, the absence of fairness is unlikely to go unnoticed. While this
article has focused on the rules used by various tribunals, this is not the only
fairness issue: the ICC has battled a perception from many in Africa that it
focuses disproportionately, perhaps even exclusively, on human rights violations there.291 In reaction to this, a small number of African nations have
withdrawn from the ICC altogether.292
In promoting fairness, one problem the UN will need to take up (as mentioned above) that is not specifically a command responsibility issue is the
phenomenon of crimes – especially gender based violence – committed by
its own personnel serving in peacekeeping missions.293 There are often significant jurisdictional hurdles to accountability for such crimes, in particular
that the accused are typically immune from international prosecution,294 leaving the UN in the position of doing little more than encouraging member
290. See supra note 177.
291. See David Bosco, Why is the International Criminal Court Picking Only on Africa, WASH. POST (Mar. 29, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/why-is-the-international-criminal-court-picking-only-on-africa/2013/03/29/cb9bf5da-96f7-11e2-97cd3d8c1afe4f0f_story.html?utm_term=.455c0258750c [https://perma.cc/F5FT-3S7S] (citing
one African Union official describing the ICC as a “neocolonial plaything”). In a somewhat
similar vein, as referenced above some commentators charged that ICTY’s docket was heavily
influenced by American political interests. See Hayden, supra note 272, at 551 (alleging that
ICTY “prosecutes only those whom the Americans want prosecuted”); see also Ford, supra
note 178, at 46 (citing Hayden); see also supra notes 177-78 and accompanying text.
292. See Abraham Joseph, Why Did South Africa, Burundi, and Gambia Decide to
Leave the International Criminal Court, WIRE (Jan. 11, 2016), https://thewire.in/76869/whydid-south-africa-burundi-and-gambia-decide-to-leave-the-international-criminal-court/
[https://perma.cc/H2ZU-2QNX]. Under a new government, Gambia has now rescinded its decision to leave the ICC. See Merrit Kennedy, Under New Leader, Gambia Cancels Withdrawal
From International Criminal Court, NPR (Feb. 14, 2017), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/02/14/515219467/under-new-leader-gambia-cancels-withdrawalfrom-international-criminal-court [https://perma.cc/MNE5-E6XQ].
293. See, e.g., Elizabeth F. Defeis, U.N. Peacekeepers and Sexual Abuse and Exploitation: An End to Impunity, 7 WASH U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 185, 185-86 (2008) (“[T]he
United Nations . . . now stands accused of egregious acts of sexual abuse and exploitation
committed by U.N. peacekeepers and civilian personnel”); Melanie O’Brien, Prosecuting
Peacekeepers in the ICC for Human Trafficking, 1 INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L. REV. 281,
281 (2006) (“The 1990s saw a dramatic increase in the number of peacekeeping operations
throughout the world. Unfortunately, there has also been a corresponding increase in the number of crimes committed by peacekeeping personnel.”).
294. See, e.g., Muna Ndulo, The United Nations Responses to the Sexual Abuse and
Exploitation of Women and Girls by Peacekeepers During Peacekeeping Missions, 27
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 127, 147 (2009) (“[I]ndividual troop-contributing countries under the
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states to address the problem seriously.295 But, it need hardly be added that
attempts by the international community to come into a country and tackle
human rights problems will be viewed skeptically if the visitors engage in
similarly egregious behavior and are not held liable. Michael Mersiades
writes, “the management of the peacekeeper’s legitimacy is the best tool for
maximizing local actor consent and preventing active opposition to peacekeeping operations.”296
The UN’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations has a manual on
standards of conduct, Accountability for Conduct and Discipline in Field Operations,297 which includes language that addresses the responsibilities of
commanders. It states that “[m]anagers and commanders are responsible for
taking steps to prevent and address misconduct on the part of their subordinates,”298 and obligates supervisors to report misconduct.299 But unlike the
statutes discussed in this article, liability for UN commanders in peacekeeping operations in this regard is effectively limited to the possibility of a poor
job performance review.300 As with their subordinates, there is no real threat
of criminal prosecution.
This lack of accountability (and the perception of unfairness that goes
with it) is an especially important problem because the impact of an international court is often felt far beyond the community’s view of the tribunal’s
own work. Professor Stromseth writes that “strengthening the rule of law depends on building people’s confidence that they will be protected from predatory state and non-state actors, that they can resolve disagreements fairly
and reliably without resorting to violence, and that legal and political institutions will protect rather than violate basic human rights. Only then is the rule

status of forces agreements are solely responsible for the conduct and discipline of their own
troops according to their own national laws and military regulations.”); Defeis, supra note
292, at 192 (“UN personnel enjoy functional immunity from prosecution by the host state
which can only be waived by the Secretary-General, while members of military contingents
are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of their respective [home state]. Thus, discipline of
offenders is uneven, and in many cases non-existent, thereby contributing to a culture of impunity.”).
295. See G.A. Res. 71/134, art. 8 (Dec. 13, 2016) (“strongly urg[ing]” member states
“to take all appropriate measures to ensure that crimes by United Nations officials and experts
on mission do not go unpunished.”).
296. Michael Mersiades, Peacekeeping and Legitimacy: Lessons From Cambodia and
Somalia, 12 INT’L PEACEKEEPING 205 (2005).
297. See United Nations, Department of Political Affairs, Department of Peacekeeping
Operations, Department of Field Support, Accountability for Conduct and Discipline in Field
Missions, U.N. Doc. (Aug. 1, 2015).
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300. Id. art. 14.3.

2018] STANDARDS IN COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY PROSECUTIONS: HOW STRICT, AND WHY?

347

of law likely to take root.”301 Thus, international actors—whether tribunal
judges and prosecutors or peacekeeping officials—who are seen to operate
fairly and consistently are important not only in a retrospective sense but
prospectively as well. To the extent that those with an interest in avoiding
prosecution can be kept from tinkering with the rules, so much the better, and
the international community needs to reach some sort of resolution to address
the crimes committed by UN personnel.302 But, as cases like Yamashita’s
demonstrate, those with nothing to fear should not be left to create unreasonable standards, either. In the aftermath of serious human rights violations,
accountability and fairness are both required.

301. Jane E. Stromseth, Pursuing Accountability for Atrocities After Conflict: What
Impact on Building the Rule of Law, 38 GEO. J. INT’L L. 251, 252 (2007). Though what I have
written here has focused on the work of international criminal tribunals, these are not the only
mechanisms employed in countries where atrocities have taken place as a means of achieving
some form of justice for the victims. Truth and reconciliation commissions have played a
significant role in this process, typically in combination with courts. See, e.g., Kathryn Sikkink
& Hun Joon Kim, The Justice Cascade: The Origins and Effectiveness of Prosecutions of
Human Rights Violations, 9 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 269, 270 (2013) (“Since the 1980s,
states have not just been initiating trials; they have also increasingly been using multiple mechanisms, including truth commissions, reparations, lustration or vetting, museums and other
memory sites, archives, and oral history projects, to address past human rights violations.”);
Stromseth, Wippman & Brooks, supra note 278, at 252 (“Advocates of the rights-based approach increasingly have recognized the need to supplement trials with noncriminal accountability mechanisms that offer alternatives to trials for lesser offenders.”).
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committed by their own nationals during operations); Defeis, supra note 293, at 201 (supporting proposal to give jurisdiction to host state over crimes committed there by UN personnel);
Catherine E. Sweetster, Note, Providing Effective Remedies to Victims of Abuse by Peacekeeping Personnel, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1643, 1646 (2008) (advocating for a UN administered
compensation scheme to victims); O’Brien, supra note 293, at 327-28 (discussing possibility
of bringing peacekeepers before ICC, but concluding that better option is for UN and member
states to take greater responsibility).

